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This thesis consists of three chapters on decision making. The first two chapters, 
co-authored with Professor Chew Soo Hong and Professor Richard. P. Ebstein, 
investigate the genetic roots for people’s attitudes towards time and uncertainty, 
and the third chapter, co-authored with Professor Chew Soo Hong, studies the 
interaction between people’s attitudes towards time and attitudes towards 
uncertainty. 
Focusing on people’s attitudes towards time, which play an important role 
when making a decision regarding future, Chapter 1 explores the genetic root for 
the variations in time discounting and the near-term bias across individuals. We 
firstly elicited the degree of impatience in the remote future and near-term bias 
based on a series of incentivized decision tasks. Then, we selected retinoic acid 
receptor-α (RARA) as a novel candidate gene for explaining individual 
differences in time discounting based on the emerging new role for retinoic acid 
(RA) as a regulator of biological rhythms within the suprachiasmatic nucleus 
(SCN) of the hypothalamus. Our main finding is that the expression level of the 
gene RARA in peripheral blood is positively correlated with the degree of 
impatience in the remote future but negatively correlated with the degree of near-
term bias. The significance of these correlations is robust with demographic 
characteristics including genders, ages and cognitive ability controlled. Of 
notable interest is the biological plausible finding that for the first time a gene 
known to be involved as mediators of rhythm in the brain has been implicated in 




In Chapter 2, we elicited people’s attitudes towards uncertainty based on 
four decision tasks involving different types of uncertainty, and we selected 10 
candidate genes for explaining individual differences in uncertainty preferences 
based on findings in the literature about genes which have been shown related 
with behaviors involving rewards, impulsivity, risk, stress, and so on. We find that 
people’ attitudes towards different types of uncertainty are associated with the 
expression level of different genes, and the expression of some individual gene 
can account for 2% variations in the degree of uncertainty aversion, which is 
plausibly strong from the perspective of genetic analysis. What’s more, from the 
cognition perspective of view, it is worth noting that the cognitive ability 
dominates the candidate genes in explaining the variation of people’s attitudes 
towards uncertainty. Our results, properly interpreted, may enhance our 
understanding of the explanation power of cognitive ability for uncertainty 
aversion. Beyond their purely descriptive value, our results also shed light on the 
use of models with heterogeneity in macro- and financial economics, and 
challenge the common assumption that people are born with identical 
preferences and identical uncertainty attitudes and that the main source of 
heterogeneity lies in the idiosyncratic shocks to individual incomes. 
Last but not least, these two studies are conceivably among the first to 
bring in measures of gene expression to investigate choice behavior elicited from 
incentivized decision making tasks. And these open a novel strategy (“blood 
genomics”) for economic modelling time preferences and uncertainty preferences 
in decision theory. 
In Chapter 3, we focus on the interaction of people's attitudes towards 
uncertainty and time, and propose three main hypotheses based on a thorough 
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review of the conceptual background. These hypotheses are (1.A) the more risk 
averse a decision maker is in risky situations, the more impatient he/she is in 
intertemporal settings; (1.B) the more risk averse a decision maker is in risky 
situations, the greater near-term bias he/she would exhibit; (2) the stronger 
common ratio effect a decision maker exhibits, the greater near-term bias he/she 
would exhibit; and (3) the more ambiguity averse a decision maker is, the greater 
near-term bias he/she would exhibit. On one hand, Hypothesis 1.A is supported 
in the near future, but gets rejected in the remote future; on the other hand, 
Hypothesis 1.B is supported from three of the four risky situations in our 
experiment, suggesting that people's risk aversion degree moderate risky 
situations is significantly positively associated with the degree of near-term bias 
people may exhibit when faced with decision situations involving different time 
delays. Furthermore, when we come to the Hypothesis 2, the experiment result in 
skewed risky decision situations turns out to provide significant support to the 
hypothesis, but the result in moderate risky decision situations does not. Besides, 
Hypothesis 3 cannot get any significant support from our experiment. In addition, 
it is also found that people's IQ value is significantly negatively associated with 
the degree of impatience both in the near future and in the remote future as well 
as the degree of near-term bias. These findings are robust to various 
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Chapter 1 Genetics of Intertemporal Decision Making 
1.1 Introduction 
Most choices in economics and daily life require decision-makers to trade off 
costs and benefits at different time points, which are referred to as intertemporal 
settings. As such, people’s attitudes towards time play an important role when 
making a decision regarding the future. Beyond psychology, where addictive 
behaviours, temptation and self-control, and personality traits such as impulsivity 
have been widely studied from different perspectives, the degree of impatience is 
an essential dimension to be included when people study intertemporal decision 
making in economics. For instance, a person offered a check that can be paid in 
one week would be tempted perhaps ‘on the spot’ to accept a somewhat 
discounted amount of money. If the check could be cashed in one month a 
person might be willing to accept a greater discounting of the initial sum. This 
phenomenon is known as delay or time discounting (Laibson, 1997; Wittmann 
and Paulus, 2008). 
The most widely used time discounting model assumes that total utility can 
be decomposed into a weighted sum – or weighted integral – of utility flows in 
each period of time (Frederick et al., 2002; Ramsey, 1928; Read, 2004; 
Samuelson, 1937): 




where 𝑡 denotes the time of evaluation, say, the current period; 𝑈𝑡  is the total 
utility from the perspective of the current period; 𝑘 refers to the number of periods 
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of delay; 𝑛 is the last period of evaluation; 𝑢𝑡+𝑘  is the instantaneous utility in 
period 𝑡 + 𝑘; and 𝐷(𝑘) is the discount function, with 𝐹(0) normalized to be 1. 
Typically, 𝐷(𝑘) is a declining function of delay. A decision maker with such a 
declining discount function is said to be impatient, and the degree of impatience 
is summarized by the discount rate, the rate at which 𝐷(𝑘) declines; that is, for 
𝑘 ≥ 1, 
𝑑(𝑘) = −
𝐷(𝑘) − 𝐷(𝑘 − 1)
𝐷(𝑘 − 1)
 
Besides, another commonly used term to characterize people’s degree of 




= 1 − 𝑑(𝑘). 
Thus, the higher the discount rate is – the lower the discount factor is, the 
more impatient the decision maker is – the greater the preference for immediate 
rewards over delayed rewards. 
In the literature, the most frequently used discount function is the exponential 
discount function: 
𝐷(𝑘) = 𝛿𝑘, 
with 0 < 𝛿 < 1. One important property of this exponential discount function is 
that the discount rate and the discount factor are independent of the horizon, 𝑘. 
Specifically, the discount rate is 𝑑(𝑘) = 1 − 𝛿 and the discount factor is 𝛿(𝑘) = 𝛿. 
However, this fails to match several empirical regularities. Most importantly, a 
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voluminous body of research has found that measured discount functions decline 
at a higher rate in the near future than in the remote future (Frederick et al., 2002; 
Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992; Loewenstein and Thaler, 1989). In other words, 
people appear to be more impatient when making short-term trade-offs – today 
vs. tomorrow – than when making long-term trade-offs – 100 days later vs. 101 
days later. This phenomenon is known as the near-term bias, which has led 
psychologists and economists to adopt discount functions in the family of 
generalized hyperbolas, including the quasi-hyperbolic discount function (Ainslie, 
1975; Ainslie and Herrnstein, 1981; Harvey, 1994; Herrnstein, 1961; Laibson, 
1997; Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992; Mazur, 1984; Strotz, 1955). 
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1 −  𝛿   ,     𝑘 = 1       
1 − 𝛿    ,    𝑘 =  , , 
 
 𝛿   ,     𝑘 = 1         
𝛿    ,    𝑘 =  , , 
 
Table 1.1 summarizes five widely used discount functions 𝐷(𝑘) in the 
literature, together with their corresponding discount rates 𝑑(𝑘)and discount 
factors 𝛿(𝑘). As one may find, different assumptions about individual discounting 
behaviour generate significant differences in the understanding of behaviour in a 
wide range of settings. For a systematic investigation of these different functions, 
one may refer to Andersen et al. (2014). 
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From the behavioural point of view, vast variations in people’s attitudes 
towards time across individuals have been documented in the literature (see 
Frederick et al. (2002); Harrison et al. (2002)), yet the determinants of these 
individual differences are not fully understood. Explaining decision makers’ 
heterogeneity in time discounting is relevant to a number of prominent topics in 
economics, like the consumption-saving theory, the asset pricing theory, the 
wealth distribution theory, and so on. More importantly, a better understanding of 
the determinants of cross-sectional variance leads to facts that theories involving 
intertemporal choices have to be consistent. While the variation can be explained 
to some extent by demographics (Barsky et al., 1997b), and there have been a 
few recent advances in identifying neurological and biological predictors of 
preferences like brain activation (Kim et al., 2008; Weber and Huettel, 2008) or 
cognitive ability (Burks et al., 2009; Dohmen et al., 2010) or even genetic 
polymorphisms (Carpenter et al., 2011), economists have yet to identify robust 
exogenous sources or hard wiring of these variations in time discounting. 
Fortunately, the increasing availability of genetic information now allows us to 
test hypotheses about candidate genes and their effects. One place to start the 
search for such genes is among those that have already been shown to account 
for variations in the observable traits and behaviours of interest.  
In this study, we selected RARA (retinoic acid receptor-α) as a novel 
candidate gene to explain individual differences in time discounting based on the 
emerging new role for retinoic acid (RA) as a regulator of biological rhythms 
within the suprachiasmatic nucleus (SCN) of the hypothalamus (Ransom et al., 
2014). Vitamin A (all trans RA) is an essential component of the mammalian diet 
that circulates in the blood in the form of retinol. Interestingly, there is a reduction 
 5 
 
in maximum pineal melatonin synthesis under vitamin A-deficient conditions. 
Several components of the RA signalling pathway oscillate according to 
photoperiodic changes in light conditions. For example, increased day length 
leads to enhanced retinoid signalling within the hypothalamus. Hence, it makes 
‘biological sense’ that there is a relationship between RARA & retinoids and time 
discounting. Such intertemporal preferences have been attributed to impulsivity 
to differences in cognitive representations between near and remote future 
events or to differences in time orientation.  
Moreover, unlike the conventional gene association studies in the literature 
(see Beauchamp et al. (2011) for a quick review), we explore the association 
between time discounting and genetic variants based on behavioural measures 
of the degree of impatience elicited from incentivized decision making tasks and 
the expression data of the candidate gene RARA. One advantage of employing 
genetic expression data is that gene expression studies capture both 
environmental as well as hard wired gene variation and hence are 
complementary and perhaps even more informative than simple gene 
association studies. Moreover, to our knowledge, there are no studies comparing 
time discounting and gene expression in peripheral blood (‘blood genomics’ 
strategy), and there are few if any studies linking time discounting to an 
individual’s overall conceptualization or perception of time. 
Our main finding is that the expression level of the gene RARA in peripheral 
blood is positively correlated with the degree of impatience in the remote future 
(ρ = 0.162, p=0.014, N=229) but negatively correlated with the degree of near-
term bias (ρ =-0.151, p=0.022, N=229). The significance of these correlations is 
robust with demographic characteristics, including genders and ages, as well as 
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cognitive ability controlled. Of notable interest is the biological plausible finding 
that for the first time a gene known to be involved as mediators of rhythm in the 
brain has been implicated in temporal decision making elicited in terms of 
impatience in the remote future and near-term bias. Finally, this is conceivably 
the first study to bring in measures of gene expression to investigate choice 
behaviour elicited from incentivized decision making tasks. 
Following this introduction section, the rest of the paper is structured as 
follows. Section 2 provides some background information of elementary concepts 
about genes and gene expression. Section 3 describes the design of our 
experiment as well as the implementation. Section 4 presents the methodology of 
our analysis and reports the results, together with a series of robustness checks. 
In Section 5, we discuss the implications of our results, limitations of this study 
and directions for future research, followed by a conclusion in Section 6. 
1.2 Elementary Concepts: Genes and Gene Expression 
 
Before proceeding to introduce the experiment design and the results, we 
would like to give a very brief introduction to some elementary concepts about 
genes and gene expression. 
1.2.1 DNA and Genes 
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is a molecule whose sequence codes the 
genetic instructions used in the growth, development, functioning and 
reproduction of all known living organisms and indeed all living organisms on this 
planet. DNA consists of two biopolymer strands coiled around each other in anti-
parallel fashion to form a double helix structure. The two DNA strands are known 
 7 
 
as polynucleotides since they are composed of simpler units called nucleotides. 
Each nucleotide is composed of a sugar called deoxyribose, a phosphate group, 
and a nitrogen-containing nucleobase – either cytosine (C), guanine (G), adenine 
(A), or thymine (T) – resulting in four distinct nucleotides. The sequence of the 
four bases or ‘letters’ of DNA – AGCT – constitutes of the genetic code. 
Due to a property of DNA called complementarity that is based on the 
physical space occupied by each base in the strand, a nucleotide with the base A 
must always be paired (opposite to) with a nucleotide with the base T and a 
nucleotide with the base C is always paired with a nucleotide with the base G, 
forming so-called base pairs and holding the two strands of DNA together.  This 
physical constraint of A paired with T and G with C explains the replication of the 
DNA molecule. When the two strands separate each strand acts as a template 
for the newly build strand and hence replicates exactly the sequence of letters in 
the DNA and the fidelity of the code. 
Genes are sequences of nucleotide base pairs (AGCT) that is initially 
transcribed into RNA (an intermediary molecule that reflects the exact order of 
‘letters’ in the DNA) and then is translated in the cell cytoplasm to protein 
products. Proteins are composed of 21 amino acids and each amino acid is 
coded for by three DNA letters e.g. ATG codes for methionine. Proteins compose 
enzymes and structural elements in cells which begin cascades of interactions 
that regulate bodily structures and functions. The human genome consists of 
approximately three billion such DNA letters (AGCT) arranged into the 23 (pairs 
of) chromosomes, but only a small portion of the genome consists of genes and 
most of the DNA does not actually code for proteins.  
 8 
 
1.2.2 Gene Expression 
In all organisms, two steps are required to read the information encoded in a 
gene's DNA and produce the protein it specifies. First, the gene's DNA is 
transcribed to messenger RNA (mRNA – which is complementary to the DNA i.e. 
the sequence of letters is the same as in DNA). Second, that mRNA is translated 
to protein. The process of producing a biologically functional molecule of either 
RNA or protein is called gene expression, and the resulting molecule is called a 
gene product. 
The information flow from DNA to RNA to protein can be controlled at 
several points helping the cell to adjust the quality and quantity of resulting 
proteins and thus self-regulate its functions. Thus, regulation of gene expression 
is vital to allow a cell to produce the gene products where and when it needs 
them; in turn, this gives cells the flexibility to appropriately respond to a variety of 
signals such as hormones which are internal signals and external environmental 
signals. Crucially important is the quantitative regulation of the amount of protein 
produced which is determined the amount of mRNA transcribed and other factors 
that determine the level at which a particular gene is expressed within a cell, 
tissue or organism.  
1.2.3 Genetic Variation 
Humans share most, but not all, of their genetic material: approximately 99.6 
percent of common genetic variants are the same when comparing any two 
unrelated individuals (Kidd et al., 2008). However, there are not two exactly 
identical individuals in the world except for identical twins. 
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Genetic variation comes in many forms, but most can be traced to one of two 
types of mutation events. The simplest mutation event is a base substitution, in 
which the base pair of a nucleotide pair is substituted for another, 
Whenever a nucleotide varies at a specific locus across individuals in the 
population, it is said to be a single nucleotide polymorphism, or SNP, with the 
different genetic variants of a SNP called “alleles.” Other forms of genetic 
variation are due to repeated segments of DNA. In variable number of tandem 
repeat (VNTR) polymorphisms, there are differences across individuals in the 
number of times that particular short segments of DNA are repeated 
(AGGGATTA). In copy number variation (CNV) polymorphisms, there are 
differences in the number of repetitions or deletions of a long segment of DNA—
of at least 1,000 base pairs and often many more. There are also whole 
chromosome deletions or additions. For example, Down’s syndrome represents a 
duplication of chromosome 21. 
The first level of genetic analysis is to analyze the sequence of DNA – the 
arrangement of the four letters – AGCT among individuals. For example, the 
sequence of a particular locus of DNA might be AGGGCCTAAG… in normal 
subjects and AGGTCCTAAG… in a subject afflicted with some disease e.g. 
hemophilia or sickle cell anemia. However, it is possible to also measure the 
expression of genes which is most easily done by measuring the levels of mRNA 
produced in a particular tissue e.g. white blood cells that are easily obtainable in 
humans. Measurement of mRNA levels in some sense captures the most 
inclusive genetic information since it is the level of mRNA which actually 
determines the level of proteins and enzymes in the cell. Ultimately, virtually all 
genetic variations and modifications will be reflected in differential mRNA 
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expression between individuals. In humans, measurement of mRNA obtained 
from blood can often be used, with important caveats, as an index of gene 
expression in other tissues (for example, brain). 
1.3 Experimental Design and Implementation 
1.3.1 Experimental Design 
1.3.1.1 Individual Discount Rates 
Participants’ discount rates were elicited from their choices in a menu related 
to the proximate future. The multiple price list design for this task in our 
experiment, which was proposed by Coller and Williams (1999) and widely used 









 Figure 1.1 The Multiple Price List Design for Discounting Rate Elicitation 
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The multiple price list above includes two sections, referred to as Near 
Future (Row 1-10) and Remote Future (Row 11-20). In each section, which 
consists of 10 pairs of choices, participants were asked to indicate their 
preferences between Choice A and Choice B. For instance, in the Near Future 
section, Choice A refers to receiving Singapore $100 (≈ US $77 in 2010) the 
next day, while Choice B refers to receiving a larger amount, ranging from $101 
to $128 in an ascending order, 31 days later. Given that the payment in Choice A 
is fixed at $100 whereas the amount for Choice B is monotonically increasing on 
the menu, if they choose Choice B rather than Choice A at some point, for 
instance in the section of Near Future, then they are expected to choose Choice 
B for all afterwards questions in this section.  
We recorded the point at which each subject switches from A to B. The 
earlier a participant’s choice switches from A to B, the more patient he/she is. 
Numerically, a number n was assigned to the case when the switching occurs 
after n A’s. In particular, 0 was assigned to those who chose B across all 
questions in a section, and 10 was assigned to those who chose A across all 
questions in a section. Hence, a higher score represents higher degree of 
impatience.  
In the subsequent analysis, we mainly focus on participants’ switching points 
in their responses to the intertemporal decision tasks, and alternative measures 
for participants’ attitudes towards time will be constructed and employed for 
robustness tests in the next section. Actually, this strategy does not rely on the 
utility function, which helps avoid quite a lot of potential estimation bias resulting 
from misspecification of utility functions (Andersen et al., 2008; 2014). 
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Moreover, according to the discussion in Section 1, the near-term bias refers 
to the scenario when the discounting rate for the same length of time, like one 
week or one month, tends to be smaller in the remote future than in the near 
future. Given the same pattern of payoffs for the Near Future and the Remote 
Future in our experiment design, a participant could be said to exhibit near-term 
bias if his/her choice switches earlier in the Remote Future than in the Near 
Future, and the difference naturally serves as a measure for the degree of near-
term bias. 
1.3.1.2 Expression Level of the RARA Gene 
We selected the retinoic acid receptor-alpha (RARA) gene as a novel 
candidate gene to explain individual differences in delay discounting as well as 
near-term bias based on the emerging new role for retinoic acid (RA) as a 
regulator of biological rhythms within the SCN. Focusing on this candidate gene, 
we measured the expression levels of RARA, based on the level of mRNA, from 
a random pick of 230 of the 1158 participants. 
1.3.1.3 Demographics and Cognitive Ability 
In addition, we also collected demographic information of the participants, 
including their genders and their ages as of the date of our experiment. Their 
proxy IQ test scores were obtained based on the Raven’s Progressive Matrices. 
1.3.2 Experimental Implementation 
As a matter of fact, the experiment data employed in this paper is only a part 
of an experimental project on decision making, which aims to explore the 
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biological foundation for economic and social decision making1. In November 
2010, 1158 Han Chinese undergraduate students were recruited from National 
University of Singapore in Singapore to participate in decision-making 
experiments, in the forms of pencil-and-paper answer sheets as well as online 
questionnaires. Participants donated 10 to 20 cc of blood for extracting DNA after 
the economic decision making tasks and lifestyle & personality questionnaires. 
The study was approved by the university’s Institutional Review Board and 
participants were given written informed consent prior to participation. 
Participants were reimbursed for participation in the project (S$25 per hour on 
average). 
1.4 Results 
To investigate the potential explanation power of the variation in the 
expression level of the RARA gene for the variation in people’s attitudes towards 
time, we followed three steps to analyse the data of our experiment and present 
the analysis results in this section. Firstly, we examined and summarized the 
participants’ responses to the intertemporal decision tasks as well as the 
expression data of the RARA gene, with the standard Pearson correlation 
coefficients calculated among the key variables; Secondly, more detailed 
multivariate regression analysis was conducted, with demographic characteristics 
and cognitive ability controlled; Thirdly, a series of robustness checks were 
implemented. 
                                                          
1
 For further details about this project, one could visit the web site of the lab for Behavioral 
Biological Economics and Social Sciences (B2ESS), http://b2ess.nus.edu.sg. 
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1.4.1 Behavioral Results and Genetic Data 
1.4.1.1 Behavioral Results 
As discussed in the previous section, participants’ switching points in their 
responses to the intertemporal decision tasks have been taken as the measure 
for the degree of impatience -- a higher score represents a higher degree of 
impatience. In the experiment, we observe the following with regards to time 
discounting, as shown in Figure 1.2. Specifically, choices in Figure 1.2(a) reveal 
that more than one third of participants exhibit their willingness to accept SG$1 
as a compensation for waiting for 30 days in the Near Future task and more than 
one half in the Remote Future task.  
 
Figure 1.2 Graphic Illustration of Behavioral Results: Near Future vs Remote Future 
Moreover, a visual inspection reveals that the switching points seem to come 
earlier in the Remote Future task than in the Near Future task. As shown in 
Figure 1.3, the red bar indicates those who show no difference in discounting the 
near future or the remote future, while the blue bars indicate a considerable 
fraction of participants who exhibit some near-term bias. 














1.4.1.2 Genetic Data 
Next, let us turn to the genetic data. The data of the normalized expression 
level of the RARA gene shows a wide range, from a minimal level of 3532 to the 
maximal level of 20799, and hence we take the natural logarithm of the variable, 
which is usually done in gene expression studies. Distributions of the genetic 
expression data are shown in Figure 1.4. 
 
Figure 1.4 Statistical Distribution of the Expression Level of RARA 
Degree of Near-Term 
Degree of Near-Term Bias 
 
Figure 1.3 Graphic Illustration of Behavioral Results: Near-Term Bias 
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1.4.1.3 Summary Statistics 
To sum up, the definition of variables and detailed descriptive statistics of the 
sample used in our following analysis are reported in Table 1.2. 
In addition, further investigation shows that (1) there is no significant gender 
difference in the degree of impatience either in the near future or in the remote 
future; (2) there is no significant gender difference in the expression level of the 
RARA gene; but that (3) there is a significant gender difference in the degree of 
near-term bias – male participants tend to exhibit higher degrees of near-term 
bias than females at 10% significance level.  
1.4.1.4 Correlation among Key Variables 
Before proceeding to the regression analysis, we choose to investigate the 
correlation between the expression level of the RARA gene and people’s 
attitudes towards time. The standard Pearson correlation coefficients with 
significance are calculated and reported in Table 1.3. Notably, the expression 
level of the RARA gene in peripheral blood is positively correlated with the 
degree of impatience in the remote future (ρ = 0.162, p=0.014, N=229) but not 
significantly correlated with the degree of impatience in the near future. 
Regarding Near-Term Bias, the expression level of the RARA gene is naturally 









Table 1.2 Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Note 
Gender (1=M) 230 0.53 0.500 0 1 A dummy variable for genders: Male=1, Female=0 
IQ 230 56 3.367 32 59 IQ test score based on Raven's Progressive Matrices 
Age 230 21.27 1.532 19 28 The age of participant as of the date of the experiment 
NFuture 229 2.93 3.047 0 10 The switching point in the section of Near Future 
RFuture 229 2.40 3.276 0 10 The switching point in the section of Remote Future 
Near-Term Bias 229 0.53 3.246 -10 10 NFuture minus RFuture 
RARA 230 10806.22     3633.469    3532.452    20799.02 The normalized expression level of the RARA gene 
RARA_LN 230 9.23  0.361 8.170 9.94 The natural logarithm of RARA 
 
Table 1.3 Standard Pearson Correlation Coefficients with Significance 
 Near Future Remote Future Near-Term Bias RARA_LN 
Near Future 1.0000    
 (-)    
Remote Future 0.4747* 1.0000   
 (0.0000) (-)   
Near-Term Bias 0.4596* -0.5635* 1.0000  
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (-)  
RARA_LN 0.0126 0.1615* -0.1511* 1.0000 
 (0.8497) (0.0144) (0.0222) (-) 





1.4.2 Econometric Analysis 
Beyond the correlation analysis, we would like to conduct detailed 
investigation into the association between the expression level of the RARA gene 
and people’s attitudes towards time based on econometric analysis.  
1.4.2.1 Near Future Impatience and Expression of RARA 
We firstly regress the degree of impatience in the near future (NFuture) on 
the logarithm of the RARA gene’s expression level (RARA_LN), and the 
insignificant coefficient, as reported in column (1) in Table 1.4, is consistent with 
the insignificant result of the correlation analysis above.  As a matter of fact, one 
might find that the adjusted R2 is 0, which indicates zero explanation power of 
RARA_LN for the variation of NFuture. 
Considering that there are many unobserved factors that might determine 
the degree of impatience both in the near future and in the remote future, we use 
the degree of impatience in the remote future (RFuture) to control these factors. 
However, the coefficient before RARA_LN is still insignificant. Moreover, after 
controlling for the demographic characteristics, including Gender and Age, we 
still have no significance in the coefficient of our interest.  
Furthermore, we include the measure of cognitive ability, IQ, in the model, 
and it is found that the significance of RARA_LN does not get improved. But the 
coefficient before IQ itself is significantly negative; that is, decision makers with 
higher IQ test scores tend to be more patient in the near future, which is 
consistent with the results of Burks et al. (2009) and Dohmen et al. (2010). 
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Table 1.4 OLS Regression Results for the Near Future 
 The Degree of Impatience in the Near Future (NFuture) 
       (1)      (2)       (3)       (4)       (5) 
RARA_LN 0.106 -0.555 -0.545 -0.458 -0.351 
 (0.18) (1.05) (1.03) (0.91) (0.70) 
RFuture  0.451*** 0.457*** 0.435*** 0.435*** 
  (6.85) (7.12) (6.61) (6.71) 
Gender (1=M)   0.432 0.443 0.126 
   (1.24) (1.28) (0.32) 
IQ    -0.123** -0.120** 
    (2.15) (2.08) 
Age     0.208* 
     (1.87) 
Constant 1.951 6.965 6.638 12.771** 7.339 
 (0.37) (1.43) (1.35) (2.17) (1.17) 
Adjusted R2 -0.00 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.24 
Observations 229 229 229 229 229 
(1) Student t-statistics are reported in the parentheses; 
(2) * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
1.4.2.2 Remote Future Impatience and Expression of RARA 
Similarly to the analysis for the degree of impatience in the near future, we 
regress on the degree of impatience in the remote future (RFuture) on the 
logarithm of the RARA gene’s expression level (RARA_LN), with NFuture, 
Gender, Age and IQ controlled step by step and report the results in Table 1.5. 
One interesting finding is that the coefficient before RARA_LN is statistically 
significant (at 1% significance level) across all models, from Column (1) to 
Column (5), which is strikingly different from the case for the near future. In other 
words, decision makers with higher expression level of the RARA gene tend to 
be more impatient in the remote future. More importantly, RARA_LN can explain 
2% of the variation in RFuture, which is quite strong for a single gene. 
Another point worth noting is that the degree of impatience in the remote 
future is not significantly correlated with the IQ test score. Additionally, there is no 
significant gender difference either in the near future or in the remote future. 
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Table 1.5 OLS Regression Results for the Remote Future 
 The Degree of Impatience in the Remote Future (RFuture) 
      (1)        (2)        (3)      (4)      (5) 
RARA_LN 1.464*** 1.410*** 1.384*** 1.416*** 1.358*** 
 (2.73) (2.85) (2.78) (2.80) (2.68) 
NFuture  0.508*** 0.511*** 0.495*** 0.500*** 
  (6.89) (6.99) (6.55) (6.65) 
Gender (1=M)   -0.636* -0.620 -0.454 
   (1.69) (1.64) (1.04) 
IQ    -0.067 -0.068 
    (0.79) (0.80) 
Age     -0.110 
     (0.80) 
Constant -11.107** -12.099*** -11.533** -8.035 -5.213 
 (2.27) (2.69) (2.55) (1.31) (0.72) 
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Observations 229 229 229 229 229 
(1) Student t-statistics are reported in the parentheses; 
(2) * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
1.4.2.3 Near-Term Bias and Expression of RARA 
Given the fact that the degree of impatience is not significantly correlated to 
the RARA gene’s expression level in the near future but significantly positively 
correlated to it in the remote future, we expect that the degree of near-term bias, 
which has been defined as NFuture minus RFuture, might be negatively 
correlated with the expression level of RARA. The regression results, as reported 
in Table 1.6, confirm the significance of the negative correlation. In words, 
decision makers with lower expression level of the RARA gene tend to exhibit 
greater degree of near-term bias. 
However, the effect of the IQ test score on the degree of near-term bias is 
not significant, even though it is significant in the near future. In other words, 
people’s cognitive ability is not significantly correlated with the difference in the 
degree of impatience between near future and remote future. 
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Table 1.6 OLS Regression Results for the Near-Term Bias 
 The Degree of Near-Term Bias (NFuture minus RFuture) 
              (1)               (2)           (3)           (4) 
RARA_LN -1.358** -1.328** -1.314** -1.204** 
 (2.25) (2.19) (2.18) (2.02) 
Gender (1=M)  0.726* 0.732* 0.408 
  (1.70) (1.71) (0.84) 
IQ   -0.031 -0.027 
   (0.36) (0.31) 
Age    0.212 
    (1.45) 
Constant 13.058** 12.405** 14.000* 8.454 
 (2.36) (2.22) (1.92) (1.04) 
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Observations 229 229 229 229 
(1) Student t-statistics are reported in the parentheses; 
(2) * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
1.4.3 Robustness Checks 
Finally, a series of robustness checks are conducted. For instance, we try 
different measures for the delay discounting rate through assuming utility function 
forms and not simply taking the switching points. One can refer to Appendix I for 
an approach to calculate the discounting rates for different switching points in the 
two intertemporal decision tasks.  
We also try different econometric specifications like probit models and (two-
limit) Tobit models to control for the ordering property and the censoring property 
of the data. For instance, estimation results for the two-limit Tobit model are 
reported in Table A.2 - Table A.4 in Appendix I. Notably, our results are robust to 
all of these checks. 
1.5 Discussion 
In this paper, we demonstrate the association between people’s attitude 
towards time and the expression level of a candidate gene, RARA. Specifically, 
we find that decision makers with lower expression level of RARA gene tend to 
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be more impatient in the remote future and in turn tend to exhibit greater near-
term bias. These results, interpreted properly, may enhance our understanding of 
people’s attitudes towards time. 
The very first point we would like to highlight is that our results make 
biological sense from several aspects that there is a relationship between 
people’s attitudes towards time and the expression of the RARA (retinoic acid 
receptor-α) gene. Firstly, people’s attitudes towards time can be viewed as a 
result of their perception or sense of time, and it has recently been documented 
that both the neural system and the visual system account for human time 
perception (Eagleman, 2008; Ivry and Schlerf, 2008; Wittmann and Paulus, 
2008). More specifically, researchers began to look at time perception around 
eye movement. For instance, Morrone et al. (2005) discovered that duration 
judgements were compressed during saccadic eye movements, and Morrone et 
al. (2005) suggested a possible explanation for the saccade results, showing 
more generally that stimuli with reduced visibility (as stimuli are during a saccade) 
lead to the same sort of duration compressions. Secondly, recent studies have 
determined that genes that control circadian rhythms are keenly involved in 
regulating the dopaminergic reward circuitry and that this regulation may be the 
cause of the increase in vulnerability and the plasticity that contributes to 
impulsivity and addictive behaviours, like alcoholic addiction or drug abuse 
(Kreek et al., 2005; Parekh et al., 2015; Partonen, 2015; Rosenwasser, 2010), 
which have been well established to be related with people’s attitude towards 
time (Chabris et al., 2006). Thirdly, circadian rhythms in mammals are regulated 
by the master circadian clock located in the suprachiasmatic nucleus (SCN) of 
the hypothalamus (Ko and Takahashi, 2006). A critical feature of circadian timing 
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is the ability of the clockwork to be reset by environmental light to the 24-h day, 
with the retino-hypothalamic tract being the principal pathway through which 
entrainment information reaches the SCN. Vitamin A is a vital component of the 
mammalian diet that is delivered to tissues in the form of circulating retinol, and it 
is particularly crucial during development of the central nervous system. Recently, 
a novel homeostatic role is emerging for RA as a regulator of biological rhythms 
within the SCN (Ransom et al., 2014). Several components of the RA signalling 
pathway oscillate according to photoperiodic changes in light conditions. For 
example, increased day length leads to enhanced retinoid signalling within the 
hypothalamus. And the RARA gene has been implicated in regulation of 
development, differentiation, apoptosis, granulopoeisis, and transcription of clock 
genes1.  
Another point we would like to emphasize is that the 2% explanation power 
of the RARA gene’s expression for the variation in the degree of impatience in 
the remote future as well as the near-term bias is plausibly strong from the 
perspective of genetic analysis. On the one hand, given the vast genetic variation, 
some specific genetic variation usually only accounts for a very small amount of 
the variance in complex human behaviours (Beauchamp et al., 2011; Benjamin 
et al., 2012; De Neve et al., 2012); on the other hand, the molecular clock 
consists of a number of genes that form transcriptional and post-transcriptional 
feedback loops, which function together to generate circadian oscillations that 
give rise to circadian rhythms of our behavioural and physiological processes, 
and hence the RARA gene is just one of them. One may refer to Ko and 
Takahashi (2006) and Zhang et al. (2013) for a detailed review about the 
                                                          
1
 Refer to http://www.genecards.org/cgi-bin/carddisp.pl?gene=RARA for more information. 
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diversity of human clock genotypes. Besides, there is likely to be a set of genes, 
whose expression, in combination with environmental factors, influences people’s 
attitudes towards time. 
What’s more, from the cognition perspective of view, it is worth noting that 
the cognitive ability dominates the RARA gene in explaining the variation of 
people’s impatience degree in the near future but that the RARA gene dominates 
the cognitive ability in the remote future. Our results, properly interpreted, may 
enhance our understanding of the explanation power of cognitive ability for time 
discounting. For instance, Burks et al. (2009) and Dohmen et al. (2010) report 
that people with lower cognitive ability are significantly more impatient, with which 
our result for the near future shares consistence. However, in those experiments, 
they did not distinguish the near future from the remote future. Furthermore, in 
the huge body of literature about the neural foundation for time discounting 
(Bechara, 2005; Weber and Huettel, 2008), there are few studies if any that 
distinguish the near future and the remote future, either. Besides, our results tend 
to suggest that whether a decision maker exhibits near-term bias does not 
significantly depend on their cognitive abilities. 
Beyond their purely descriptive value, our results also shed light on the use 
of models with heterogeneity in macro- and financial economics (Aiyagari, 1993; 
Freeman, 1996; Mankiw, 1986; Telmer, 1993) and challenge the common 
assumption that people are born with identical preferences and identical discount 
rates and that the main source of heterogeneity lies in the idiosyncratic shocks to 
individual incomes. But, as we have documented, people’s attitudes towards time 
could be very different, which has a solid biological foundation, and these 
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differences could and should be taken into consideration to specify the 
preference heterogeneity to explain economic and financial outcomes. 
Besides, our study has several potential limitations that should be addressed 
by future research. Firstly, in genetic analysis, it is very important to replicate the 
results for some specific genetic variation in independent samples. Such efforts 
to replicate a significant association result, as well as increasing the sample sizes, 
are critical to exclude the possibility that the original association would be 
spurious (De Neve et al., 2012). However, due to budget constraints, we have no 
replication sample in this study. Secondly, to measure the degree of decision 
makers’ impatience, we mainly focus on their switching points in the responses to 
the intertemporal decision tasks presented by multiple price lists, although there 
are some other seemingly plausible approaches proposed in the recent literature 
(Andersen et al., 2008; 2014; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012a). More importantly, 
our primary objective in this study is to establish the association between the 
expression level of the RARA gene and people’s attitudes towards time, but not 
to explore the quantitative effect. In other words, it is not our primary interest to 
investigate whether a decision maker with an expression level of RARA 1% 
higher than the average level would be more impatient than the average by 1.5% 
or 5%. Thirdly, people might be concerned about the extent to which laboratory 
behaviour generalizes to the field (Harrison and List, 2004; Levitt and List, 2007). 
As a matter of fact, robust results have been reported to show that individual 
laboratory-measured discount rates predict field behaviour in a very broad sense, 
including smoking, drinking, exercise, nutrition, saving, borrowing, wealth, and 
gambling (Chabris et al., 2008). Again, related to the second point, our primary 
aim is at the direction of the association but not the quantitative effects. Lastly, 
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one might care about the representativeness of our sample. On the one hand, 
the 230 participants whose RARA gene’s expression levels were measured are 
expected to be representative of the whole sample, since they were randomly 
picked out from the 1130 participants. Actually, distributions of the behavioral 
data are also compared over the whole sample and the subsample, but no 
significant difference is found. On the other hand, it might be true that the whole 
sample may not be representative of the Chinese population or even the 
Singaporean Chinese population, because all of our 1130 participants are 
geographically concentrated in Singapore and relatively more educated than the 
Singapore population. With these caveats in mind, we consider our results to be 
only suggestive. However, we believe that these methodological problems have 
primarily reduced the statistical clarity of our findings rather than biasing our 
results towards the conclusion that we have reported. 
Most importantly, to our knowledge, the current report is the first showing a 
gene known to be involved as mediators of rhythm in the brain has been 
implicated in temporal decision making elicited as impatience in the remote future 
as well as near-term bias. And this is apparently the first study to bring in 
measures of gene expression to investigate choice behaviour elicited from 
incentivized decision making tasks. These open a novel strategy (“blood 
genomics”) for economic modelling time preference in decision theory. 
1.6 Conclusion 
Time is a very important factor in decision making in the sense that the 
degree of impatience is an essential dimension to be included when people study 
dynamic decision making in economics. Focusing on the variation in the degree 
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of impatience, this paper investigates the explanatory power by the expression 
level of the candidate gene, RARA (retinoic acid receptor-α), which has recently 
been implicated in regulation of development, differentiation, apoptosis, 
granulopoeisis, and transcription of clock genes. One of the main findings is that 
the expression level of the RARA gene in peripheral blood is positively correlated 
with the degree of impatience in the remote future; in words, decision makers 
with lower expression level of RARA gene tend to be more impatient in the 
remote future. But there is no such significance in the near future. Another finding 
is that the expression level of the RARA gene is negatively correlated with the 
degree of near-term bias. These plausible findings are robust with cognitive 
ability and demographic characteristics, including genders and ages, controlled.  
To our knowledge, it is for the first time that a gene known to be involved as 
mediators of rhythm in the brain has been implicated in temporal decision making 
elicited in terms of impatience in the remote future and near-term bias. And this is 
conceivably the first study to bring in measures of gene expression to investigate 




Chapter 2 Genetics of People's Attitudes towards 
Uncertainty 
2.1 Introduction 
One of the most fundamental problems of modern decision theory is the analysis 
of decisions under uncertainty. From the behavioural point of view, vast 
variations in people’s attitudes towards uncertainty across individuals have been 
documented in the literature (see Machina (1987); Starmer (2000)), yet the 
determinants of these individual differences are not fully understood. Explaining 
the heterogeneity in decision makers’ attitudes towards uncertainty is relevant to 
a number of prominent topics in economics, like the asset pricing theory, the 
wealth distribution theory, and so on. More importantly, a better understanding of 
the determinants of cross-sectional variance leads to facts that theories involving 
uncertain choices have to be consistent. While the variation can be explained to 
some extent by demographics (Barsky et al., 1997b), and there have been a few 
recent advances in identifying neurological and biological predictors of 
preferences like brain activation (Kim et al., 2008; Weber and Huettel, 2008) or 
cognitive ability (Burks et al., 2009; Dohmen et al., 2010) or even genetic 
polymorphisms (Carpenter et al., 2011), economists have yet to identify robust 
exogenous sources or hard wiring of these variations in uncertainty preferences. 
Fortunately, the increasing availability of genetic information now allows us to 
test hypotheses about candidate genes and their impacts on decision making. 
One place to start the search for such genes is among those that have already 




In this study, we selected ten candidate genes based on findings in the 
literature about genes which have been shown related to behaviors involving 
rewards, impulsivity, risk, stress, and so on. These genes are ADRB1, AR, 
AVPR1A, COMT, ERBB3, ESR1, ESR2, HTR2A, MAOA, and NRG1. For 
instance, previous studies suggest that a single nucleotide polymorphism in the 
catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT) gene (val158met) may modulate reward-
guided decision making in healthy individuals. The polymorphism affects 
dopamine catabolism and thus modulates prefrontal dopamine levels, which may 
lead to variation in individual responses to risk and reward (Lancaster et al., 2015; 
Lancaster et al., 2012). In the first result to link attitude towards longshot risks to 
a specific gene, Zhong et al. (2009) observe a significant association between 
subjects' preference for the longshot lottery and a widely studied, promoter-
region repeat functional polymorphism in monoamine oxidase A gene (MAOA). In 
another study, Chew et al. (2012) report some significant association between 
the estrogen receptor beta (ESR2) gene with ambiguity aversion among female 
subjects. 
Moreover, unlike the conventional gene association studies in the literature 
(see Beauchamp et al. (2011) for a quick review), we explore the association 
between people’s attitudes towards uncertainty and genetic variants based on 
behavioural measures of the degree of uncertainty aversion elicited from 
incentivized decision making tasks and the expression data of the candidate 
genes. One advantage of employing genetic expression data is that gene 
expression studies capture both environmental as well as hard wired gene 
variation and hence are complementary and perhaps even more informative than 
simple gene association studies. Another advantage is that genetic expression 
data provides more variations than SNP data, in the sense that people with the 
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same SNP in the same gene may still exhibit vast variation in the expression 
level. More importantly, to our knowledge, there are no studies comparing 
uncertainty aversion and gene expression in peripheral blood (‘blood genomics’ 
strategy). 
Following this introduction section, the rest of the paper is structured as 
follows. Section 2 describes the design of our experiment as well as the 
implementation. Section 3 presents the methodology of our analysis and reports 
the results, together with a series of robustness checks. In Section 4, we 
conclude with a brief discussion about the implications of our results, limitations 
of this study and directions for future research. 
2.2 Experimental Design and Implementation 
2.2.1 Experimental Design 
2.2.1.1 Elicitation of People’s Attitudes towards Uncertainty 
To elicit people's attitudes towards uncertainty in different contexts, we 
asked the subjects to respond to decision tasks in four types of uncertain 
decision situations, including two risky situations with explicit probabilities and 
another two ambiguous situations without explicit probabilities given. In particular, 
the two risky situations are the Moderate Prospect Task (MP) and the Moderate 
Hazard Task (MH), and the two ambiguous situations are the Ambiguous 
Prospect Task (AP), and the Ambiguous Hazard Task (AH).  
The decision tasks are all presented in the form of multiple price lists (MPLs) 
with monetary payments (Holt and Laury, 2002). More specifically, we list ten 
pairs of options in each decision sheet for a specific decision situation, and each 
pair includes a fixed Option A and a varying Option B, with the 10 different Option 
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B's arranged in an ascending manner in terms of value, the amount of money. 
Given a price list, a decision maker with consistent preferences in a specific 
setting is expected to have a "switching" point between preferring Option A or 
Option B, and this switching point is believed to carry interval information about 
his/her preference. 
For the sake of illustration, let's take the Moderate Prospect Task (MP) as an 
example. In this task, the expected value of the fixed Option A is $30, which 
corresponds to the seventh pair on the risk price list. Hence, if one chooses 
Option A initially and switches to Option B later but before or exactly at the 
seventh pair, we will say that this decision maker is risk-averse; and in an 
extreme case, if one does not choose Option A at all, he/she is risk-averse, of 
course, and his/her degree of risk aversion is viewed higher than those choosing 
at least one Option A on the list. On the other hand, if one chooses Option A 
initially and switches to Option B later than the seventh pair, we will say that this 
decision maker is risk-seeking; and, again, in an extreme case, if one does not 
choose Option B at all, he/she will be viewed as risk-seeking, with a higher 
degree of risk seeking than those choosing at least one Option B on the list. 
Correspondingly, the number of subjects' choices of Option A would be recorded, 
and we call this number the switching point in a task with specific situations, 
which could be viewed as a measure of the degree of risk aversion given the 
context. Therefore, subjects indicated by a number less than or equal to 7 are 
risk-averse, while those indicated by a number greater than 7 are risk-seeking. 
Moreover, the earlier the switching point is on the risk price list, the more risk-
averse the decision maker is. In particular, those indicated "0" are the most risk-
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averse subjects in our sample, while those indicated "10" are the most risk-
seeking. 
Besides, there are several minor points about the differences among the four 
tasks. The first point is that tasks MP and AP are in the gain domain while tasks 
MH and AH in the loss domain; the second point is about the interpretation of the 
switching points in the task MH - subjects indicated by a number less than or 
equal to 4 are risk-averse, while those indicated by a number greater than 4 are 
risk-seeking; and the third point is about the difference between task MP (MH) 
and task AP (AH) – there are no explicit probabilities given in AP or AH, which 
cases are referred to as ambiguous situations. In the Ambiguous Prospect case, 
we follow the literature and take the expected payoff of the Option A as $30. 
Subsequently, we refer to those who switch from Option A to Option B before or 
exactly at the seventh pair on the ambiguity price list as uncertainty-averse 
decision makers in ambiguous situations. Similarly, in task AH, subjects indicated 
by a number less than or equal to 4 are uncertainty-averse, while those indicated 
by a number greater than 4 are uncertainty-seeking. Since the four tasks are 
designed in the same form, it's not necessary to discuss them one by one, and 
one can refer to Appendix III for the exact format of decision sheets presented to 
the subjects. 
Moreover, we can also compare a subject’s switching points in task MP and 
AP, and the difference between them, say, AP minus MP, could be viewed as a 
measure for the degree of ambiguity aversion in the gain domain. And similarly, 
the difference between the switching points in task MH and AH, AH minus MH, 




In the subsequent analysis, we mainly focus on participants’ switching points 
in their responses to the decision tasks, and alternative measures for participants’ 
attitudes towards uncertainty will be constructed and employed for robustness 
tests. In effect, this strategy does not rely on the utility function, which helps 
avoid quite a lot of potential estimation bias resulting from misspecification of 
utility functions (Chen and Pu, 2004; Reynaud and Couture, 2012). 
2.2.1.2 Expression Level of Candidate Genes 
In the present study, we selected 10 candidate genes based on findings in 
the literature about genes which have been shown related to behaviors involving 
rewards, impulsivity, risk, stress, and so on. These genes are ADRB1, AR, 
AVPR1A, COMT, ERBB3, ESR1, ESR2, HTR2A, MAOA, and NRG1. For 
instance, previous studies suggest that a single nucleotide polymorphism in the 
catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT) gene (val158met) may modulate reward-
guided decision making in healthy individuals. The polymorphism affects 
dopamine catabolism and thus modulates prefrontal dopamine levels, which may 
lead to variation in individual responses to risk and reward (Lancaster et al., 2015; 
Lancaster et al., 2012). In the first result to link attitude towards longshot risks to 
a specific gene, Zhong et al. (2009) observe the significant association between 
subjects' preference for the longshot lottery and a widely studied, promoter-
region repeat functional polymorphism in monoamine oxidase A gene (MAOA). 
One may refer to Appendix IV for more detailed discussion about the rationales 
for the candidate gene selection. Focusing on these candidate genes, we 




2.2.1.3 Demographics and Cognitive Ability 
In addition, we also collected demographic information of the participants, 
including their genders and their ages as of the date of our experiment. Their 
proxy IQ test scores were obtained based on the Raven’s Progressive Matrices. 
2.2.2 Experimental Implementation 
As a matter of fact, the experiment data employed in this paper is only a part 
of an experimental project on decision making, which aims to explore the 
biological foundation for economic and social decision making1. In November, 
2010, 1158 Han Chinese undergraduate students were recruited from National 
University of Singapore in Singapore to participate in decision-making 
experiments, in the forms of pencil-and-paper answer sheets as well as online 
questionnaires. Participants donated 10 to 20 cc of blood for extracting DNA after 
the economic decision making tasks and lifestyle & personality questionnaires. 
The study was approved by the university’s Institutional Review Board and 
participants were given written informed consent prior to participation. 
Participants were reimbursed for participation in the project (S$25 per hour on 
average). 
2.3 Results 
To investigate the potential explanation power of the variation in the 
expression level of candidate genes for the variation in people’s attitudes towards 
uncertainty, we followed three steps to analyse the data of our experiment and 
present the analysis results in this section. Firstly, we examined and summarized 
the participants’ responses to the four decision tasks as well as the expression 
                                                          
1
 For further details about this project, one could visit the web site of the lab for Behavioral 
Biological Economics and Social Sciences (B2ESS), http://b2ess.nus.edu.sg. 
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data of the candidate genes, with the standard Pearson correlation coefficients 
calculated among the key variables. Secondly, detailed multivariate regression 
analyses were conducted, with demographic characteristics and cognitive ability 
controlled. Thirdly, a series of robustness checks were implemented. 
2.3.1 Behavioral Results and Genetic Data 
2.3.1.1 Behavior in Risky Situations 
As we have discussed in the section of experimental design, to capture 
people's attitudes towards risk in different situations, we asked the subjects to 
respond to two tasks involving the gain case and the loss case, which are the 
Moderate Prospect Task (MP) and the Moderate Hazard Task (MH). Now, let us 
take a look at the subjects' behavioural patterns in different situations one by one, 
before investigating the potential interrelation between attitudes towards 
uncertainty and time. 
 
Figure 2.1 Distribution of Switching Points in Task MP and Task MH 
In the Moderate Prospect Task (MP), as shown in Figure 2.1(a), 81.58% of 
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chose the first Option B before or exactly at the seventh pair, corresponding to 
the expected value of the fixed Option A, $30, and hence should be viewed as 
risk-averse decision makers; while the other 18.42% of the subjects switched 
after the seventh pair or even did not choose Option B at all and hence are risk-
seeking. This pattern together with more detailed distributional characteristics 
indicates that in the moderate risky situations with potential gains, risk-averse 
subjects account for the majority. This observation is consistent with the result of 
the student-t test.  
However, in the Moderate Hazard Task (MH), as shown in Figure 2.1(b), 
only 12.61% of subjects switched before the fourth pair, corresponding to the 
expected value of the fixed Option A, $7.5, while the other 87.39% of them 
switched at or after the fourth pair, suggesting that in the moderate risky 
situations with potential losses, the majority of subjects exhibit risk seeking 
attitudes. This finding is supported by the result of the student-t test. 
2.3.1.2 Behavior in Ambiguous Situations 
Besides the two tasks with probabilities of the uncertain situations explicitly 
given, we also have another two tasks without explicit probabilities given in the 
uncertain decision-making situations, which we refer to as the Ambiguous 
Prospect Task (AP), and the Ambiguous Hazard Task (AH). Now, let us turn to 
examine the subjects' responses to the decision tasks in the two ambiguous 
situations. 
In the Ambiguous Prospect Task (AP), as shown in Figure 2.2 (a), more than 
90% of subjects are indicated by a number less than or equal to 7, which means 
they chose the first Option B before or exactly at the seventh pair, with the fixed 
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Option A and "Receiving $30 for sure" as Option B, and hence should be viewed 
as uncertainty-averse decision makers. In particular, more than 40% of subjects 
are extremely uncertainty-averse in the sense that they might choose Option B if 
an even smaller amount of money than $15 is offered in that option.  
 
Figure 2.2 Distribution of Switching Points in Task AP and Task AH 
But when coming to the Ambiguous Hazard Task (AH), as shown in Figure 
2.2(b), one can find that more than 70% of subjects are risk-loving in the sense 
that they switched at or after the fourth pair from Option A to Option B.  
Moreover, as one might have noticed, the reversal from being risk averse in 
Task AP to being risk loving in Task AH is parallel to that from Task MP to Task 
MH. 
2.3.1.3 Comparison between Risky and Ambiguous Situations 
Furthermore, comparing the subjects' behaviour patterns in Task MP and 
Task AP, one may note that the distributions are quite different, although the 
uncertainty-aversion patterns in both cases are significant. In particular, almost 
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subjects chose Option B when "Receiving $23 for sure" was available in Task AP, 
while in Task MP, only 40% chose Option B even when "Receiving $29 for sure" 
was available. In addition, the statistical tests suggest that the switching point 
locations in the two tasks, MP and AP, are significantly different from each other, 
and that the switching point in Task AP is significantly earlier than that in Task 
MP. Actually, this behaviour pattern has been well documented in the literature, 
which can be traced back to Ellsberg (1961), and the difference of the degrees of 
uncertainty aversion in the two situations is referred to as ambiguity aversion.  
Since we have taken the switching point as a measure of the degree of 
uncertainty aversion, we can take the difference of the switching point locations 
in the two tasks, and view it as a measure of ambiguity aversion. From Figure 
2.3(a), one can find the pattern of ambiguity aversion exhibited in the subjects' 
behaviour is significant, which is also consistent with the tests upon the 
difference between the behaviour patterns in Task MP and Task AP. A similar 
comparison between Task MH and Task AH is also illustrated in Figure 2.3(b). 
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2.3.1.4 Genetic and Demographic Data 
Next, let us turn to the genetic data. Focusing on ten candidate gene, we 
collect the normalized level of their expression, which shows a very broad range, 
and hence we take the natural logarithm of these variables, which is usually done 
in gene expression studies. Table 2.1 summarizes some detailed descriptive 
statistics of the genetic expression data, together with the demographic data. 
Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Note 
ADRB1 210 2.79 0.84 -1.00 5.04 The natural logarithm of expression level of the ADRB1 gene 
AR 227 5.04 0.58 1.19 6.32 The natural logarithm of expression level of the AR gene 
AVPR1A 228 6.13 0.53 4.50 7.59 The natural logarithm of expression level of the AVPR1A gene 
COMT 229 8.14 0.32 7.11 9.10 The natural logarithm of expression level of the COMT gene 
ERBB3 227 4.07 0.62 2.22 8.24 The natural logarithm of expression level of the ERBB3 gene 
ESR1 228 5.27 0.44 3.75 7.87 The natural logarithm of expression level of the ESR1 gene 
ESR2 224 4.01 0.53 1.68 5.26 The natural logarithm of expression level of the ESR2 gene 
HTR2A 207 2.79 0.83 -0.89 4.86 The natural logarithm of expression level of the HTR2A gene 
MAOA 222 4.53 1.19 -0.74 7.76 The natural logarithm of expression level of the MAOA gene 
NRG 230 7.23 0.60 4.34 10.20 The natural logarithm of expression level of the NRG gene 
Gender 230 0.53 0.500 0 1 A dummy variable for genders: Male=1, Female=0 
RPM IQ 230 56 3.367 32 59 IQ test score based on Raven's Progressive Matrices 
Age 230 21.27 1.532 19 28 The age of participant as of the date of the experiment 
2.3.1.5 Correlation among Key Variables 
Before proceeding to the regression analysis, we choose to investigate the 
correlation between the expression level of the candidate genes and people’s 
attitudes towards uncertainty. The standard Pearson correlation coefficients with 
significance are calculated and reported in Table 2.2. 
Notably, the degree of uncertainty (risk) aversion in the Moderate Prospect 
Task (MP) is significantly positively correlated with the degree of uncertainty 
aversion across all other three tasks, which suggests that people’s attitudes 
towards different types of uncertainty share some common factors. However, 
should one closely investigate the correlation among the other three tasks, 
he/she may find 1) people’s attitudes towards loss in different kinds of uncertain 
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situations (MH and AH) also share some common factors, but 2) people’s 
attitudes towards loss in risky situation (MH) is not significantly correlated their 
attitudes towards gain in ambiguous situation (AP). Moreover, it seems that 
people’s attitudes towards ambiguity in the gain domain share no common 
factors with the loss domain. 
Moreover, according to the correlation between attitudes towards uncertainty 
and the expression level of candidate genes, it seems attitudes towards different 
types of uncertainty are correlated with the expression of different genes. For 
example, the degree of uncertainty (risk) aversion in the Moderate Prospect Task 
(MP) is associated with the expression level of ERBB3, ERS1 and HTR2A, while 
the degree of uncertainty aversion in the Ambiguous Hazard Task (AH) is 






Table 2.2 Standard Pearson Correlation Coefficients with Significance 
 MP MH AP AH AP-MP AH-MH ADRB1 AR AVPR1A COMT ERBB3 ESR1 ESR2 HTR2A MAOA NRG1 
MP 1                
 (-)                
MH 0.157* 1               
 0.020 (-)               
AP 0.247* -0.031 1              
 0.000 0.644 (-)              
AH 0.124* 0.469* -0.001 1             
 0.065 0.000 0.990 (-)             
AP-MP -0.612* -0.140* 0.616** -0.095 1            
 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.160 (-)            
AH-MH 0.013 -0.366* 0.019 0.651* 0.006 1           
 0.856 0.000 0.779 0.000 0.926 (-)           
ADRB1 -0.002 0.087 0.139* -0.004 0.116* -0.076 1          
 0.980 0.213 0.046 0.952 0.097 0.285 (-)          
AR 0.024 0.045 -0.027 0.124* -0.045 0.080 0.000 1         
 0.724 0.512 0.690 0.067 0.506 0.248 0.999 (-)         
AVPR1A 0.064 0.032 -0.113* 0.158* -0.136* 0.132* -0.088 0.273* 1        
 0.341 0.633 0.091 0.019 0.042 0.055 0.203 0.000 (-)        
COMT -0.005 0.044 0.092 0.046 0.086 0.005 0.165* 0.001 0.257* 1       
 0.938 0.512 0.166 0.492 0.197 0.937 0.017 0.987 0.000 (-)       
ERBB3 0.124* 0.110 0.055 -0.007 -0.046 -0.117* 0.208* 0.040 0.091 0.297* 1      
 0.064 0.105 0.408 0.919 0.499 0.088 0.003 0.552 0.174 0.000 (-)      
ESR1 0.151* -0.002 0.118* 0.104 -0.035 0.097 0.086 0.140* 0.178* 0.116* 0.232* 1     
 0.023 0.977 0.078 0.125 0.606 0.157 0.214 0.036 0.007 0.081 0.000 (-)     
ESR2 -0.003 0.004 0.030 0.050 0.037 0.070 0.071 -0.081 -0.015 0.263* 0.160* 0.124* 1    
 0.962 0.949 0.654 0.466 0.585 0.313 0.308 0.225 0.827 0.000 0.017 0.064 (-)    
HTR2A 0.135* 0.120* -0.040 0.213* -0.132* 0.104 -0.080 0.218* 0.260* 0.195* -0.011 0.071 -0.011 1   
 0.055 0.090 0.570 0.003 0.060 0.149 0.268 0.002 0.000 0.005 0.877 0.308 0.871 (-)   
MAOA 0.053 -0.071 -0.031 -0.161* -0.077 -0.129* 0.037 0.075 0.083 0.177* 0.091 0.058 -0.030 0.097 1  
 0.433 0.303 0.647 0.018 0.260 0.065 0.595 0.269 0.218 0.008 0.179 0.394 0.658 0.168 (-)  
NRG1 0.108 0.095 -0.032 0.117* -0.105 0.030 -0.045 0.201* 0.175* -0.068 0.076 0.117* -0.082 0.115 0.010 1 
 0.105 0.156 0.628 0.082 0.117 0.658 0.516 0.002 0.008 0.305 0.256 0.078 0.223 0.100 0.884 (-) 
Note: (1) The first line is the Pearson correlation coefficient and the second line is the p-value; 
   (2) * denotes the correlation coefficients significant at the 10% level or lower. 
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2.3.2 Econometric Analysis 
Beyond the correlation analysis, we would like to conduct an investigation 
into the association between the expression level of the ten candidate genes and 
people’s attitudes towards uncertainty based on econometric analysis.  
2.3.2.1 Uncertainty Aversion in Risky Situation (MP) and 
Gene Expression 
Guided by the results of the correlation test above, we firstly regress the 
degree of uncertainty aversion in the Moderate Prospect Task (MP) on the log of 
the expression level of ERBB3, ERS1 and HTR2A, respectively. And the 
significant coefficients, as reported in columns (1-3) in Table 2.3, are consistent 
with the significant results of the correlation analysis above. 
As a matter of fact, one might find that the adjusted R2 indicates 2% 
explanation power of ESR1 and 1% explanation power of ERBB3 and HTR2A for 
the variation in the degree of uncertainty aversion in the Moderate Prospect Task. 
From the perspective of genetic study, this is quite plausible given that there are 
a huge number of genes.  
Moreover, after controlling for the demographic characteristics, including 
Gender and Age, as well as the measure of cognitive ability, IQ, in the model, 
there is no significant change in the coefficients, as reported in columns (4-6). 
And even when all of the three genes are included in the model, it’s found that 









Table 2.3 Robust OLS Regression Results for the Moderate Prospect Task (MP) 
 Switching Point in the Moderate Prospect Task (MP) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
ERBB3 0.557*   0.627**   0.562 
 (1.81)   (2.05)   (1.58) 
ESR1  0.970**   0.962**  0.541 
  (2.38)   (2.36)  (1.12) 
HTR2A   0.452**   0.474** 0.458** 
   (2.06)   (2.17) (2.04) 
Gender (1=M)    0.464 0.450 0.658 0.540 
    (1.13) (1.13) (1.54) (1.24) 
IQ    -0.128** -0.119** -0.132*** -0.146*** 
    (2.47) (2.44) (2.61) (2.67) 
Age    0.062 0.068 0.051 0.079 
    (0.53) (0.59) (0.44) (0.67) 
Constant 2.978** 0.133 3.906*** 8.315** 5.169 9.801** 5.003 
 (2.30) (0.06) (6.20) (2.21) (1.20) (2.57) (1.01) 
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 
Observations 225 226 205 225 226 205 204 
(1) Student t-statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; 




Besides, the coefficient before IQ itself is significantly negative; that is, 
decision makers with higher IQ test scores tend to be more patient in the near 
future, which is consistent with the results of Burks et al. (2009) and Dohmen et 
al. (2010). 
2.3.2.2 Uncertainty Aversion in Risky Situation (MH) and 
Gene Expression 
Using the same strategy, we regress the degree of uncertainty aversion in 
the Moderate Hazard Task (MH) on the log of the expression level of HTR2A. 
Again, the significant coefficient, as reported in column (1) in Table 2.4, is 
consistent with the significant results of the correlation analysis above.  
Table 2.4 Robust OLS Regression Results for the Moderate Hazard Task (MH) 
 
Switching Point in the Moderate Hazard Task (MH) 
(1)  (2) (3) 
HTR2A 0.437* 0.370 0.230 
 (1.84) (1.55) (0.94) 
Gender (1=M)  -0.827* -0.970** 
  (1.68) (2.04) 
IQ  -0.007 0.006 
  (0.14) (0.13) 
Age  -0.186 -0.204 
  (1.33) (1.50) 
A1   0.195** 
   (2.16) 
Constant 5.376*** 10.380** 9.475** 
 (7.72) (2.45) (2.41) 
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.04 0.06 
Observations  200 200 198 
(1) Student t-statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; 
(2) * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
However, after controlling for the demographic characteristics, including 
Gender and Age, as well as the measure of cognitive ability, IQ, in the model, the 
coefficient before HTR2A is no longer significant. Another interesting finding is 
that the coefficient before IQ is no longer significant but that there seems to be 
significant difference between genders, which confirms the findings by Borghans 
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et al. (2009). Moreover, controlling for A1, as shown in column (3), does not 
change the results much. 
2.3.2.3 Uncertainty Aversion in Ambiguous Situation (AP) 
and Gene Expression 
Now, let us turn to the Ambiguous Prospect Task (AP). Table 2.5 reports the 
robust regression results of the degree of uncertainty aversion in Task AP on the 
log of the expression level of ADRB1, AVPR1A and ESR1, respectively. As 
predicted by the correlation analysis above, the coefficients of major interest, as 
reported in columns (1-3) in Table 2.5, are significantly different from 0, which 
does not show any significant change with Gender, Age and IQ controlled in 
columns (4-6) in Table 2.5. When all of the three genes are included in the model, 
the significance of coefficients before HTR2A and ESR1 does not change, with 
that of AVPR1A dropping slightly.  
Besides, another point worth mentioning is that the degree of uncertainty 










Table 2.5 Robust OLS Regression Results for the Ambiguous Prospect Task (AP) 
 
Switching Point in the Ambiguous Prospect Task (AP) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
ADRB1 0.466**   0.504**   0.454** 
 (2.12)   (2.26)   (2.01) 
AVPR1A  -0.599*   -0.588*  -0.541 
  (1.80)   (1.77)  (1.54) 
ESR1   0.762*   0.736* 1.044** 
   (1.92)   (1.81) (2.22) 
Gender (1=M)    0.566 0.501 0.473 0.495 
    (1.29) (1.18) (1.09) (1.14) 
IQ    0.000 -0.005 -0.007 0.009 
    (0.01) (0.08) (0.12) (0.15) 
Age    -0.181 -0.206 -0.199 -0.171 
    (1.37) (1.56) (1.51) (1.32) 
Constant 1.316** 6.274*** -1.387 4.756 10.583** 3.088 2.012 
 (2.17) (3.05) (0.66) (1.07) (2.20) (0.66) (0.37) 
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 
Observations 208 226 226 208 226 226 207 
(1) Student t-statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; 
(2) * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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2.3.2.4 Uncertainty Aversion in Ambiguous Situation (AH) 
and Gene Expression 
Taking a similar strategy to the previous three tasks, we report the robust 
regression results of the degree of uncertainty aversion in the Ambiguous Hazard 
Task (AH) on the log of the expression level of AR, AVPR1A, AHTR2A, MAOA 
and NRG1 in Table 2.6, with Gender, Age and IQ controlled step by step. 
One interesting finding is that degree of uncertainty aversion in the Task AH 
is significantly positively associated with the expression level of AHTR2A, but 
significantly negatively associated with the expression level of MAOA. These 
results are robust to different sets of controls. 
Again, the degree of uncertainty aversion in Task AH shares no significant 






Table 2.6 Robust OLS Regression Results for the Ambiguous Hazard Task (AH) 
 Switching Point in the Ambiguous Hazard Task (AH) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
AR 0.755*     0.768*     0.522 
 (1.70)     (1.71)     (1.04) 
AVPR1A  1.059**     1.012**    0.769 
  (2.38)     (2.25)    (1.43) 
HTR2A   0.944***     0.952***   0.733*** 
   (3.65)     (3.73)   (2.80) 
MAOA    -0.481**     -0.430**  -0.576*** 
    (2.46)     (2.16)  (3.02) 
NRG1     0.714*     0.673* 0.810* 
     (1.92)     (1.76) (1.73) 
Gender (1=M)      -0.154 -0.113 -0.147 -0.082 -0.160 0.072 
      (0.26) (0.20) (0.25) (0.14) (0.28) (0.12) 
IQ      0.138 0.128 0.119 0.110 0.132 0.071 
      (1.59) (1.61) (1.52) (1.26) (1.62) (0.88) 
Age      0.121 0.048 0.111 0.020 0.090 0.053 
      (0.63) (0.25) (0.57) (0.11) (0.47) (0.28) 
Constant 1.800 -0.879 2.866*** 7.807*** 0.446 -8.493 -8.706 -6.117 1.006 -8.490 -12.340* 
 (0.79) (0.32) (3.77) (8.60) (0.16) (1.22) (1.35) (1.04) (0.15) (1.29) (1.68) 
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.09 
Observations 220 221 200 215 223 220 221 200 215 223 195 
(1) Student t-statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; 




2.3.2.5 Ambiguity Aversion and Gene Expression 
Lastly, let’s turn to the measure of ambiguity aversion both in the gain 
domain and in the loss domain. As one might have noticed in the correlation test 
in Table 2.2, MP has no significant correlation with the expression level of 
ADRB1, while AP has significantly positive correlation with this gene, and 
naturally, the measure of ambiguity aversion in the gain domain, AP-MP, is 
significantly positively correlated with the expression level of ADRB1. Following 
the same logic, we have the significantly negative correlation between AP-MP 
and the expression level of AVPR1A and HTR2A. However, with regards to the 
gene of ESR1, whose expression level has been found significantly correlated 
with both MP and AP, we do not find any significant correlation between it and 
the degree of ambiguity aversion in the gain domain, AP-MP. These results are 
confirmed by the robust OLS regression results in Table 2.7, with no significant 
changes when the demographic characteristics are controlled. 
Similar reasoning also applies to the measure of ambiguity aversion in the 
loss domain, AH-MH, and similar results are found in the significant association 
between AH-MH and the expression level of AVPR1A, ERBB3, and MAOA, as 
reported in Table 2.8. Again, both AH and MH are significantly positively 
associated with the expression of HTR2A, but it seems that AH-MH has no 









Table 2.7 Robust OLS Regression Results for Ambiguity Aversion over Gains (AP-MP) 
 Ambiguity Aversion over Gains (AP-MP) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
ADRB1 0.465*    0.552*    0.360 
 (1.66)    (1.96)    (1.25) 
AVPR1A  -0.886*    -0.911*   -0.503 
  (1.75)    (1.76)   (0.97) 
HTR2A   -0.533*    -0.533*  -0.403 
   (1.66)    (1.77)  (1.24) 
ESR1    -0.274    -0.293 0.290 
    (0.60)    (0.64) (0.47) 
Gender (1=M)     0.006 -0.012 -0.131 -0.003 -0.212 
     (0.01) (0.03) (0.26) (0.01) (0.40) 
IQ     0.122 0.127 0.163* 0.121 0.166* 
     (1.50) (1.61) (1.91) (1.56) (1.83) 
Age     -0.253* -0.264* -0.285* -0.288* -0.224 
     (1.72) (1.76) (1.88) (1.85) (1.49) 
Constant -3.807*** 2.825 -1.072 -1.149 -5.485 1.509 -4.083 -1.718 -5.238 
 (4.90) (0.90) (1.13) (0.48) (0.97) (0.23) (0.67) (0.27) (0.66) 
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.03 
Observations 206 224 203 224 206 224 203 224 188 
(1) Student t-statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; 








Table 2.8 Robust OLS Regression Results for Ambiguity Aversion over Loss (AH-MH) 
 Ambiguity Aversion over Gains (AH-MH) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
AVPR1A 0.846*    0.806*    0.547 
 (1.83)    (1.76)    (1.00) 
ERBB3  -0.647*    -0.826**   -0.941** 
  (1.87)    (2.58)   (2.15) 
MAOA   -0.377*    -0.388*  -0.316 
   (1.83)    (1.93)  (1.50) 
HTR2A    0.439    0.519** 0.459* 
    (1.62)    (2.02) (1.69) 
Gender (1=M)     0.897 0.871 0.936 0.976 1.166* 
     (1.51) (1.47) (1.60) (1.61) (1.83) 
IQ     0.107 0.129* 0.083 0.088 0.088 
     (1.50) (1.77) (1.10) (1.31) (1.27) 
Age     0.212 0.244 0.200 0.254 0.187 
     (0.95) (1.11) (0.92) (1.14) (0.82) 
Constant -6.265** 1.527 0.659 -2.245*** -17.010** -10.635 -8.666 -13.360** -9.950 
 (2.18) (1.07) (0.70) (2.84) (2.44) (1.56) (1.30) (2.13) (1.40) 
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.07 
Observations 213 213 207 193 213 213 207 193 188 
(1) Student t-statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; 




2.3.3 Robustness Checks 
 
Finally, a series of robustness checks are conducted. Firstly, we try different 
econometric specifications, like Probit and (two-limit) Tobit models, to control for 
the ordering property and the censoring property of the data. As reported in 
Appendix V, little difference is found in the signs and the significance of 
coefficients of our major interest when we compare the robust OLS regression 
results and the Tobit regression results. Moreover, we also try different measures 
for people’s attitudes towards uncertainty through assuming utility function forms 
but not simply taking the switching points. More specifically, we calculate the 
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) in each uncertain situation for each 
subject based on the switching point from Option A to Option B on the 
uncertainty price list. The switching point could be regarded as the certainty 
equivalence of the subject with respect to the risky option. The calculation 
method for CRRA is described in Appendix VI. Notably, our results are robust to 
all of these checks. 
2.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, we demonstrate the association between people’s attitude 
towards uncertainty and the expression level of 10 candidate genes, which are 
ADRB1, AR, AVPR1A, COMT, ERBB3, ESR1, ESR2, HTR2A, MAOA, and 
NRG1.  
The very first point we would like to highlight is that the 2% explanation 
power of one individual gene’s expression for the variation in the degree of 
uncertainty aversion is plausibly strong from the perspective of genetic analysis. 
On the one hand, given the vast genetic variation, some specific genetic variation 
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usually only accounts for a very small amount of the variance in complex human 
behaviours (Beauchamp et al., 2011; Benjamin et al., 2012; De Neve et al., 
2012); on the other hand, there is likely to be a set of genes, whose expression, 
in combination with environmental factors, influencing people’s attitudes towards 
uncertainty. 
What’s more, from the cognition perspective of view, it is worth noting that 
the cognitive ability dominates the candidate genes in explaining the variation of 
people’s attitudes towards uncertainty. Our results, properly interpreted, may 
enhance our understanding of the explanation power of cognitive ability for 
uncertainty aversion. For instance, Burks et al. (2009) and Dohmen et al. (2010) 
report that people with lower cognitive ability are significantly more risk-seeking, 
which is consistent with our results for risky situations. However, our results tend 
to suggest that whether a decision maker exhibits ambiguity aversion does not 
significantly depend on their cognitive abilities. 
Beyond their purely descriptive value, our results also shed light on the use 
of models with heterogeneity in macro- and financial economics (Aiyagari, 1993; 
Freeman, 1996; Mankiw, 1986; Telmer, 1993) and challenge the common 
assumption that people are born with identical preferences and identical 
uncertainty attitudes and that the main source of heterogeneity lies in the 
idiosyncratic shocks to individual incomes. But, as we have documented, 
people’s attitudes towards uncertainty could be very different, which has a solid 
biological foundation, and these differences could and should be taken into 
consideration when we specify the preference heterogeneity to explain economic 
and financial outcomes. 
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Besides, our study has several potential limitations that should be addressed 
by future research. Firstly, in genetic analysis, it is very important to replicate the 
results for some specific genetic variation in independent samples. Such efforts 
to replicate a significant association result, as well as increasing the sample sizes, 
are critical to exclude the possibility that the original association would be 
spurious (De Neve et al., 2012). However, due to budget constraints, we have no 
replication sample in this study. Secondly, to measure the degree of decision 
makers’ uncertainty aversion, we mainly focus on their switching points in the 
responses to the uncertain decision tasks presented by multiple price lists, 
although there are some other seemingly plausible approaches proposed in the 
recent literature. More importantly, our primary objective of this study is to 
establish the association between the expression level of the candidate genes 
and people’s attitudes towards uncertainty, but not to explore the quantitative 
effect. Thirdly, people might be concerned about the extent to which laboratory 
behaviour generalizes to the field (Harrison and List, 2004; Levitt and List, 2007). 
As a matter of fact, robust results have been reported to show that individual 
laboratory-measured risk preferences predict filed behaviour in a very broad 
sense, including smoking, drinking, exercise, nutrition, saving, borrowing, wealth 
accumulation, and gambling (Chabris et al., 2008). Again, related to the second 
point, our primary aim is at the direction of the association but not the quantitative 
effects. Lastly, one might care about the representativeness of our sample. On 
the one hand, the 230 participants whose candidate genes’ expression levels 
were measured are expected to be representative of the whole sample, since 
they were randomly picked out of the 1158 participants. Actually, distributions of 
the behavioral data are also compared with the whole sample and the subsample, 
but no significant difference is found. On the other hand, it might be true that the 
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whole sample may not be representative of the Chinese population or even the 
Singaporean Chinese population, because all of our 1158 participants are 
geographically concentrated in Singapore and relatively more educated than the 
entire Singapore population. With these caveats in mind, we consider our results 
to be only suggestive. However, we believe that these methodological problems 
have primarily reduced the statistical clarity of our findings rather than biasing our 
results towards the conclusion that we have reported. 
Most importantly, this is apparently the first study to bring in measures of 
gene expression to investigate choice behaviour elicited from incentivized 
decision making tasks. It opens a novel strategy (“blood genomics”) for economic 
modelling uncertainty preference in decision theory.  
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Chapter 3 Interacting Time and Uncertainty: Theory 
and Evidence 
3.1 Introduction 
Uncertainty and time are two most fundamental attributes in a typical 
decision situation, and hence people’s attitudes towards uncertainty and time are 
naturally vital dimensions to consider when we model how people make 
decisions. In the huge body of literature about decision making, enormous 
amounts of efforts have been devoted, along two distinguished branches, 
towards developing alternatives to the expected utility theory (EUT) and 
alternatives to the discounted utility (DU) theory, with a typical focus on one of 
the two attitudes. Even in the discounted expected utility theory, which takes both 
attitudes into consideration, these two dimensions are still treated separately.  
Although time and uncertainty initially appear different, there are closely 
related in a number of ways. Both are attributes that pertain to the delivery of 
choice objects – the time of delivery or the likelihood of occurring – rather than to 
characteristics of the objects themselves. Furthermore, time and uncertainty are 
typically correlated with one another in the real world. Specifically, anything that 
is delayed is inherently uncertain, and since it always takes time for uncertainty 
to resolve, uncertain outcomes are typically delayed. As in Prelec and 
Loewenstein (1991), these connections raise the possibility that the observed 
parallelism of choice behaviour is unique to these two dimension. Furthermore, 
they propose that discounting of delays and probabilities is due to a common 
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internal aversive state (subtracting from reward value) generated by the delay 
period (with delayed rewards) and by losses (with probabilistic rewards).   
However, what has to be admitted is that the nature of the mechanism 
underlying the interaction between uncertainty and time has been a matter of 
debate for some time. For instance, one natural question is which of the two is 
more fundamental. According to Rotter (1954), who first proposed the idea that 
people behave similarly in face of uncertainty and time, people choose a smaller 
more immediate reward over a larger but delayed reward because, in the local 
culture, promises of delayed rewards are rarely given or, if given, broken. In other 
words, delays of gratification act like less-than-unity probabilities, and longer 
delays means lower probabilities. In this sense, Rotter (1954) argues that 
probability discounting is more fundamental, and similar arguments can also be 
found in Keren and Roelofsma (1995), Weber and Chapman (2005) as well as 
Dasgupta and Maskin (2005). While some others argue that the decision making 
processes used uncertain choices might be a subset of those used by 
intertemporal choices because for repeated trials, the smaller the probability of 
receiving an outcome, the longer the time to receive the outcome (Rachlin et al., 
1986; Rachlin et al., 1991; Rachlin and Siegel, 1994).  
Rather than speculating about possible answers to that question, some 
others prefer to be guided by data to study the correlation between preferences 
over risk and preferences over time, and the results remain mixed. Barsky et al. 
(1997a) find no correlation between risk attitude and the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution. Eckel et al. (2005) conduct a field study of time and 
risk, and find that subjects who choose the less risky lotteries have significantly 
higher individual discount rates, but they do not estimate the relationship 
 58 
 
between risk and time preferences. More recently, Andersen et al. (2008) use the 
information on risk attitudes to infer the discount rate defined over utility, predict 
risk attitudes and discount rates for each of their subjects using structural 
estimation approaches, and report evidence of a positive correlation between risk 
aversion and impatience. However, this result fails to be replicated by Sutter et al. 
(2013), who report that higher individual levels of risk aversion predict more 
patience. 
Besides these studies based on separate decision tasks aiming to elicit 
preferences over risk and time, there are several studies based on decision tasks 
involving both time and risk. Anderhub et al. (2001) use the Becker-Degroot-
Marschak (BDM) procedure to elicit certainty equivalents for lotteries with varied 
payoff dates, and directly investigate the interaction between risk attitudes and 
time preferences. In particular, in their study, 61 subjects are asked to price a 
simple lottery in three different scenarios: at the first, the lottery premium is paid 
"now"; at the second, it is paid "later"; and at the third, it is paid "even later", and 
the main result is a statistically negative correlation between subjects’ degree of 
risk aversion and their (implicit) discount factors. Besides, Ahlbrecht and Weber 
(1997) use a similar design, albeit with hypothetical rewards, and find no 
significant relationship between risk aversion and individual discount rates in the 
gain domain.  
As one may note, most studies just focus on people’s attitudes towards time 
and risk, but the potential correlation between attitudes towards ambiguity and 
time seems to have seldom been studied. Moreover, the potential interrelation 
between anomalies to the expected utility theory (EUT), for instance, the Allais 
behaviour (Machina, 1987; Starmer, 2000), and anomalies to the discounted 
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utility (DU) theory, like the diminishing impatience (Frederick et al., 2002; Laibson, 
1997; Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992), has received little attention (Andreoni and 
Sprenger, 2012b; Halevy, 2008; Saito, 2011). In the present paper, we would 
propose three testable hypotheses based on a thorough review of the literature 
on the interrelation between attitudes towards time and uncertainty: (1.A) the 
more risk averse a decision maker is in risky situations, the more impatient 
he/she is in intertemporal settings; (1.B) the more risk averse a decision maker is 
in risky situations, the greater near-term bias he/she would exhibit; (2) the 
stronger common ratio effect a decision maker exhibits, the greater near-term 
bias he/she would exhibit; and (3) the more ambiguity averse a decision maker is, 
the greater near-term bias he/she would exhibit. 
Beyond these, we also test these three hypotheses based on a large-sample 
experiment. On one hand, Hypothesis 1.A is supported in the near future, but 
gets rejected in the remote future; on the other hand, Hypothesis 1.B is 
supported from three of the four risky situations in our experiment, suggesting 
that the degree of people's risk aversion in moderate risky situations is 
significantly positively associated with the degree of near-term bias people may 
exhibit when faced with decision situations involving different time delays. 
Furthermore, when we come to the Hypothesis 2, the experiment result in 
skewed risky decision situations (CRL) turns out to provide significant support to 
the hypothesis, but the result in moderate risky decision situations (CRH) does 
not. Besides, Hypothesis 3 cannot get any significant support from our 
experiment. In addition, it is also found that people's IQ value is significantly 
negatively associated with the degree of impatience both in the near future and in 
the remote future as well as the degree of near-term bias. These findings are 
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robust to various econometric analysis approaches, various measures of the two 
kinds of attitudes as well as a replication study. 
Following this introduction section, the rest of the paper is structured as 
follows. Section 2 thoroughly reviews the conceptual background, with the three 
hypotheses proposed. Section 3 describes the design of our experiment as well 
as its implementation. Section 4 presents the methodology of our analysis and 
reports the results for testing the three hypotheses. In Section 5, we conduct a 
series of robustness checks. This is followed by Section 6, which concludes and 
discusses the implications of our results, limitations of this study and directions 
for future research. 
3.2 Conceptual Background and Hypotheses 
Consider such a continuous intertemporal decision making situation, where 
the decision maker (DM) is evaluating such a prospect, 𝑃 = ((𝑀, 𝑝), 𝑇), at the 
time point 𝑡, based on a discounted expected utility (DEU) function: 
𝑈𝑡(𝑃) = 𝐷(𝑇 − 𝑡)𝑉(𝑀, 𝑝)                                                      (1) 
where (𝑀, 𝑝) denotes a binary lottery of receiving an amount of money 𝑀 at a 
probability of 𝑝 and 0 at a probability of 1 −  𝑝; 𝑇 (> 𝑡) is the time point of delivery 
of the lottery; 𝑉(∙) denotes the DM’s periodic valuation function of the lottery, and 
𝐷(𝑇 − 𝑡)  is the discount function, with  𝐷(0) normalized to be 1. In particular, 
when 𝑡 = 0, we have  
𝑈0(𝑃) = 𝐷(𝑇)𝑉(𝑀, 𝑝)                                                        (2) 
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Typically, 𝐷(𝑇 − 𝑡) is a deceasing function of the time interval, 𝑇 − 𝑡. That is, 
given a fixed 𝑇(> 𝑡) , 𝐷(𝑇 − 𝑡) is increasing in 𝑡. A decision maker with such a 
discount function is said to be impatient, and the degree of impatience is 
summarized by the discount rate, the rate at which 𝐷(𝑇 − 𝑡) changes as time 
moves onwards; that is, for 0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇, 
𝑑(𝑡) =
 ?̇?(𝑇 − 𝑡)
 𝐷(𝑇 − 𝑡)
 
where ?̇?(𝑇 − 𝑡) =
𝜕𝐷(𝑇 𝑡)
𝜕𝑡
. Thus, the higher the discount rate is, the more 
impatient the DM is – the greater the preference for immediate rewards over 
delayed rewards. 
In the literature, the most frequently used discount function is the exponential 
discount function: 
𝐷(𝑇 − 𝑡) = 𝑒 𝛿(𝑇 𝑡), 𝑤 𝑡  0 < 𝛿 < 1 
One important property 1  of this exponential discount function is that the 
discount rate, which is 𝛿, is independent of the horizon, 𝑡. And this property has 
an immediate prediction about the consistency property of people’s behaviour 
over time, as summarized in Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1: Given two prospects, P = ((M, p), T) and P′ = ((M′, p′), T′), 







′) ⇔ 𝑈𝑡(𝑃) > 𝑈𝑡(𝑃
′) at all 0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇. 
                                                          
1
 For more detailed discussion about the properties of the exponential discount function, one 
may refer to Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue (2002). 
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(PROOF: It follows immediately from the fact that 𝑈0(𝑃) = 𝑒
 𝛿𝑡𝑈𝑡(𝑃).) 
Furthermore, one widely used functional form for the DM’s periodic valuation 
function 𝑉(∙) is an expected utility form; that is, 
𝑉(𝑀, 𝑝) = 𝑝𝑢(𝑀) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑢(0). 
where 𝑢(∙) denotes the DM’s instant utility function of monetary payoffs Thus, the 
DM’s valuation function would take the following form, which is referred to as the 
Discounted Expected Utility (DEU) Model. 
𝑈𝑡(𝑃) = 𝑒
 𝛿(𝑇 𝑡)𝑝𝑢(𝑀)                                                         (3) 
Given this specification, the model predicts a link between the degree of risk 
aversion and the degree of impatience through the curvature of the utility function 
𝑢(∙), summarized in Hypothesis 1.A. 
Hypothesis 1.A The more concave the DM’s utility function, the more 
risk averse a decision maker is in risky situations, and the more impatient 
he/she is in intertemporal settings. 
However, the DEU fails to match several empirical regularities. One failure of 
this model is that it cannot account for the phenomenon of diminishing 
impatience, as defined below, which means that measured discount functions 
decline at a higher rate in the near future than in the remote future (Frederick et 
al., 2002; Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992; Loewenstein and Thaler, 1989). 
Another failure of the DEU model is that it cannot account for Allais behaviour, 





Definition 1: Diminishing Impatience 
The DM exhibits diminishing impatience if 
𝜕𝑑(𝑡)
𝜕𝑡
< 0 at all 0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇. 
 
As a matter of fact, it is well known that the exponential discounting model 
does not allow for diminishing impatience, and that the expected utility model 
does not allow for Allais behaviour. In other words, to account for diminishing 
impatience and Allais behaviour, one has to modify the DEU model. One way 
that the DEU model has been generalized in order to allow for diminishing 
impatience is by allowing for non-exponential discount functions, 𝐷(𝑇 − 𝑡). For 
instance, psychologists and economists have tried to adopt discount functions in 
the family of generalized hyperbolas, including the hyperbolic discount function 
and quasi-hyperbolic discount function (Ainslie, 1975; Ainslie and Herrnstein, 
1981; Harvey, 1994; Herrnstein, 1961; Laibson, 1997; Loewenstein and Prelec, 
1992; Mazur, 1984; Strotz, 1955). In these generalized models, the prediction in 
Hypothesis 1.A still holds. In addition, these models also predict an relationship 
between the curvature of the utility function and the pattern of diminishing 
impatience, as summarized in Hypothesis 1.B. However, there is no predicted 
link between violations of EUT and the pattern of discounting rates. 
Hypothesis 1.B The more risk averse a decision maker is in risky 
situations, the greater near-term bias he/she would exhibit. 
Another generalization of the DEU model is to replace the expected utility in 
the model by non-expected utility to evaluate lotteries like (𝑀, 𝑝) so that Allais 
behaviour could be accounted for. As Machina (1989) figures out, a DM who has 
non-expected utility preferences over state-contingent outcomes, and who treats 
borne risk in the manner of continuing to take it into account ex post, will be 
immune to the dynamic inconsistent behaviour. In other words, the pattern of 
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diminishing impatience would not be allowed when the resolution of uncertainty is 
not an issue to the DM. 
Therefore, it seems a feasible direction to include the timing of uncertainty 
resolution, which was first figured out by Kreps and Porteus (1978) as a choice 
variable, to account for Allais behaviour and diminishing impatience in a 
discounted non-expected utility model. In this line, Chew and Epstein (1989) are 
the first to axiomatize timing preference using a within-period non-expected utility 
function based on the idea of betweenness (Chew, 1983; Chew, 1989). And 
another recent try is Halevy (2008), who incorporates the resolution of the 
uncertainty that is inherently involved in time. 
Basically, Halevy (2008) tries to explain diminishing impatience through 
treating the future as inherently risky. With a constant stopping probability 
(hazard) of 𝜆 introduced to capture the intuitive idea of implicit risk value, Halevy 
(2008) modifies the DEU as follows1: 
𝑈𝑡(𝑃) = 𝑒
 𝛿(𝑇 𝑡)𝑔(𝑒 𝜆(𝑇 𝑡))𝑝𝑢(𝑀)                                             (4) 
where 𝛿 is referred to as the constant “pure” time preference, and 𝑔(∙) is a rank-
dependent probability-weighting function, satisfying 𝑔(0) = 0, and 𝑔(1) = 1.  
Thus, the discount function of this DM is 𝐷(𝑇 − 𝑡) = 𝑒 𝛿(𝑇 𝑡)𝑔(𝑒 𝜆(𝑇 𝑡)). It 
follows that the discounting rate  
𝑑(𝑡) =
 ?̇?(𝑇 − 𝑡)




+ 𝛿  with  𝑞 ≜ 𝑒 𝜆(𝑇 𝑡). 
                                                          
1
 In the original model of Halevy (2008), the setting is based a discrete time structure. Moreover, 
in his set-up, the future payoff is a sure amount of monetary payoff but not a lottery. 
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As Halevy (2008) and Saito (2011) show, in this set up, there is a tight link 
between probability weighting (i.e. the property of function 𝑔(∙)) and diminishing 
impatience. More specifically, a DM who exhibits no probability weighting will 
exhibit no diminishing impatience; however, a DM exhibits diminishing 
impatience if he/she weights probabilities exactly in the way required for the 
common ratio effect. Following the CLAIM (3) in Saito (2011), we propose 
Hypothesis 2 naturally. 
Hypothesis 2 The stronger common ratio effect a decision maker 
exhibits, the greater near-term bias he/she would exhibit. 
From the theoretical point of view, as one might have noticed, the critical 
reason why Halevy (2008) can account for both Allais behaviour (common ratio 
effect) and diminishing impatience is that the introduction of the stopping 
probability has changed the resolution structure in the sense that the non-
expected utility DM’ immunisation conditions for dynamic inconsistency (Machina, 
1989) no longer hold. 
Furthermore, as Halevy (2008) as well as Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) 
argue, the present is known while the future is inherently risky, and the 
asymmetry between the present and the future in the sense of uncertainty 
underpins the present-biased behaviour. In this sense, we can view time as a 
source of uncertainty, especially the kind of uncertainty that could be perceived 
but not be measured. Hence, people’s attitudes towards time may interact with 
people’s attitudes towards ambiguity. More specifically, this intuition is 
summarized in Hypothesis 3 as follows. 
Hypothesis 3 The more ambiguity averse a decision maker is, the 
greater near-term bias he/she would exhibit.  
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3.3 Experimental Design and Implementation 
3.3.1 Experimental Design 
3.3.1.1 Elicitation of People’s Attitudes towards Uncertainty 
Firstly, to elicit people's attitudes towards uncertainty in different contexts, 
we asked the subjects to respond to decision tasks in five types of uncertain 
decision situations, including four risky situations with explicit probabilities and 
one ambiguous situation without explicit probabilities given. In particular, the four 
risky situations include two Moderate Prospect Tasks (MP and MP’), one High 
Prospect Task (HP) as well as one Low Prospect Task (LP), and the ambiguous 
situation is the Ambiguous Prospect Task (AP).  
The decision tasks were all presented in the form of multiple price lists 
(MPLs) with monetary payments (Holt and Laury, 2002). More specifically, we 
listed ten pairs of options in each decision sheet for a specific decision situation, 
and each pair includes a fixed Option A and a varying Option B, with the 10 
different Option B's arranged in an ascending manner in terms of value (MP and 
AP) or probability (MP’, HP and LP). Given a price list, a decision maker with 
consistent preferences in a specific setting is expected to have a "switching" 
point from preferring Option A to preferring Option B, if any, and this switching 
point is believed to carry interval information about his/her preference. 
For the sake of illustration, let's take the Moderate Prospect Task (MP) as an 
example. In this task, the expected value of the fixed Option A is $30, which 
corresponds to the seventh pair on the risk price list. Hence, if one chooses 
Option A initially and switches to Option B later but before or exactly at the 
seventh pair, we will say that this decision maker is risk-averse; and in an 
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extreme case, if one does not choose Option A at all, he/she is risk-averse, of 
course, and his/her degree of risk aversion is viewed higher than those choosing 
at least one Option A on the list. On the other hand, if one chooses Option A 
initially and switches to Option B later than the seventh pair, we will say that this 
decision maker is risk-seeking. In addition, in an extreme case, if one does not 
choose Option B at all, he/she will be viewed as risk-seeking, with a higher 
degree of risk seeking than those choosing at least one Option B on the list. 
Correspondingly, the number of subjects' choices of Option A, ranging from 0 to 
10, would be recorded, and this number is referred to as the switching point in a 
task with specific situations, which could be viewed as a measure of the degree 
of risk aversion given the context. In particular, the earlier the switching point is 
on the risk price list, the more risk-averse the decision maker is.  
Given that the seventh pair on the price list of Task MP corresponds to a 
benchmark for risk neutrality, we take the difference between 7 and the switching 
point of a subject as the risk premium requested by the subject, which could be 
viewed as an equivalent measure for the degree of risk aversion of the subject. 
And it follows that the risk premium for Task MP ranges from -3 to 7, that 
subjects with positive (negative) values are risk averse (seeking), and that a 
higher value means a higher degree of risk aversion, with 0 corresponding to risk 
neutrality.  
Besides, there are several important points about the differences among the 
seven tasks. Firstly, the only difference between in Task MP and Task AP is that 
there are no explicit probabilities given in AP, which case is referred to as an 
ambiguous situation, and we follow the literature, taking the expected payoff of 
the Option A in Task AP as $30 and taking the difference between 7 and the 
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switching point of a subject in Task AP as the uncertainty premium requested by 
the subject. Secondly, Task MP and Task MP’ are different in the way that the 
fixed Option A is a lottery in Task MP but a certain amount of money ($30) in 
Task MP’, while the varying Option B is a varying amount of money with the 
amount displayed in an ascending manner on the list of Task MP but a varying 
lottery with the probability of receiving a fixed amount of money ($60) displayed 
in an ascending manner on the list of Task MP’. Thirdly, similarly to Task MP’, 
the varying Option B in both Task HP and Task LP is a varying lottery with the 
probability of receiving a fixed amount of money ($60) displayed in an ascending 
manner on the list, but the fixed Option A in these two tasks is a lottery. 
Since the five tasks are designed in the same form, it's not necessary to 
discuss them one by one, and one can refer to Appendix VII for the exact format 
of decision sheets presented to the subjects. 
Moreover, we can also compare a subject’s risk premium in Task MP and 
his/her uncertainty premium in Task AP, and the difference between them, say, 
AP minus MP, could be viewed as the ambiguity premium requested by the 
subject, a measure for the degree of ambiguity aversion. Similarly, we take the 
difference between the switching points in Task MP’ and Task HP, MP’ minus HP, 
as a measure of the common ratio effect for the High Prospect Task, and take 
the difference between the switching points in Task MP’ and Task LP, MP’ minus 
LP, as a measure of the common ratio effect for the Low Prospect Task. 
3.3.1.2 Elicitation of People’s Attitudes towards Time  
Secondly, we also asked the subjects to give their responses to decision 
tasks in two kinds of intertemporal settings so that we can capture their attitudes 
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towards time. The multiple price list design for this task in our experiment, which 
was proposed by Coller and Williams (1999) and widely used in experimental 










The multiple price list above includes two sections, referred to as Near 
Future (Row 1-10) and Remote Future (Row 11-20). In each section, which 
consists of 10 pairs of choices, participants were asked to indicate their 
preferences between Choice A and Choice B. For instance, in the Near Future 
section, Choice A refers to receiving Singapore $100 (≈ US $77 in 2010) next 
day, while Choice B refers to receiving a larger amount, ranging from $101 to 
$128 in an ascending order, 31 days later. Given that the payment in Choice A is 
fixed at $100 whereas the amount for Choice B is monotonically increasing on 
Figure 3.1 The Multiple Price List Design for Discounting Rate Elicitation 
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the menu, if they choose Choice B rather than Choice A at some point, for 
instance in the section of Near Future, then they are expected to choose Choice 
B for all afterwards questions in this section.  
Similarly to the five decision tasks in uncertain situations, we also recorded 
the point at which each subject switches from A to B in the two intertemporal 
decision tasks. Numerically, a number n was assigned to the case when the 
switching occurs after n A’s. In particular, 0 was assigned to those who chose B 
across all questions in a section, and 10 was assigned to those who chose A 
across all questions in a section. So, the earlier a participant’s choice switches 
from A to B, the more patient he/she is. Alternatively speaking, a higher score 
represents higher degree of impatience.  
Moreover, according to the discussion in Section 1, the near-term bias refers 
to the scenario when people are less impatient in the remote future than in the 
near future. Based on our experiment design above, a participant could be said 
to exhibit near-term bias if his/her choice switches earlier in the Remote Future 
than in the Near Future, and the difference naturally serves as a measure for the 
degree of near-term bias. 
3.3.1.3 Demographics and Cognitive Ability 
In addition, we also collected demographic information of the participants, 
including their genders and their ages as of the date of our experiment. Their 
proxy IQ test scores were obtained based on the Raven’s Progressive Matrices. 
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3.3.2 Experimental Implementation 
As a matter of fact, the experimental data employed in this paper is only a 
part of a sizable experimental project on decision making, which lasted from 
November 2010 to December 2015, aiming to explore the biological foundation 
for economic and social decision making1.  
From November 2010 to January 2011, 1158 Han Chinese undergraduate 
students from National University of Singapore and 669 Chinese Han students 
from universities within Haidian District in Beijing, China, were recruited to 
participate in decision-making experiments, in the forms of pencil-and-paper 
answer sheets as well as online lifestyle & personality questionnaires. In October 
2012, we recruited another 1069 Han Chinese undergraduate students from 
National University of Singapore and another 614 Han Chinese undergraduate 
students from universities in Beijing, and all of the subjects completed the same 
set of decision tasks. Hence, in total, we have 3510 subjects. 
Moreover, almost all participants in the two rounds donated 10 to 20 cc of 
blood for extracting DNA after these tasks. Participants were reimbursed for 
participation in the project (S$25 per hour in Singapore and CNY100 per hour on 
average). 
3.4 Results 
In this section, we would follow three steps to analyse the behaviour of our 
subjects in various situations and proceed to investigate the potential interrelation 
between attitudes towards uncertainty and time. Firstly, we examined and 
                                                          
1
 For further details about this project, one could visit the web site of the lab for Behavioral 
Biological Economics and Social Sciences (B2ESS), http://b2ess.nus.edu.sg. 
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summarized the subjects' behaviour in both uncertain situations and 
intertemporal situations; secondly, we reported the correlation between subjects' 
attitudes towards uncertainty and time based on the Spearman correlation test; 
thirdly, we tested the three hypotheses based on econometric analysis. All of the 
analyses in this section were based on subjects' switching points in their 
responses to various tasks (MP’, HP, LP, NFuture, and RFuture) or 
risk/uncertainty premium defined based on the switching points (MP and AP). 
This strategy, which does not rely on the utility function, helps avoid quite a lot of 
potential estimation bias resulting from misspecification of utility functions. 1 
Alternative measures for subjects' attitudes towards uncertainty and time would 
be constructed and employed for robustness tests in the next section. 
3.4.1 Behavioral Results 
3.4.1.1 Behavioral in Uncertain Situations 
As we have discussed in the experimental design, to capture people's 
attitudes towards risk in different situations, we asked the subjects to respond to 
five tasks involving risk, which are Task MP, Task AP, Task MP’, Task HP, and 
Task LP. Now, let's take a look at the subjects' behavioural patterns in different 
situations one by one, before investigating the potential interrelation between 
attitudes towards uncertainty and time. 
                                                          
1
 For such kind of potential bias, one may refer to Andersen et al. (2008), Andreoni and Sprenger 




Figure 3.2 Distribution of Risk/Uncertainty Premium in Task MP and Task AP 
In the Task MP, as shown in Figure 3.2(a), 78.8% of subjects are indicated 
by a number greater than 0, which means they chose the first Option B before at 
the seventh pair, corresponding to the expected value of the fixed Option A, $30, 
and hence should be viewed as risk-averse decision makers, while the other 12.6% 
of the subjects indicated by a negative number switched after the seventh pair or 
even did not choose Option B at all and hence are risk-seeking. This pattern 
together with more detailed distributional characteristics indicates that in the 
moderate risky situations with potential gains, risk-averse subjects account for 
the majority, which is consistent with the result of student-t test.  
However, In the Task AP, as shown in Figure 3.2(b), about 90% of subjects 
are indicated by a number greater than 0, and hence should be viewed as 
uncertainty-averse decision makers. In particular, more than 30% of subjects are 
extremely uncertainty-averse in the sense that they might choose Option B if an 
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(a) Risk Premium in the Moderate Prospect Task (MP)
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(b) Uncertainty Premium in the Ambiguous Prospect Task (AP)




Figure 3.3 Distribution of Switching Points in Task MP’, Task HP and Task LP 
Similarly, we have the distribution of switching points in the other three risk 
decision tasks (Task MP’, Task HP, and Task LP) shown in Figure 3.2. According 
to the design of these three tasks, a higher score of the switching point means a 
higher degree of risk aversion. As one may have observed, given the second 
point as the benchmark point for risk neutrality, most of subjects are risk averse 
in these three tasks, although the patterns are different.  
3.4.1.2 Evidence for Allais Behavior and Ambiguity Attitudes 
Furthermore, comparing Task AP and Task MP, we can take the difference 
between the uncertainty premium in Task AP and the risk premium in Task MP, 
and view it as a measure of ambiguity aversion (Ellsberg, 1961). From Figure 3.4, 
one can find the pattern of ambiguity aversion exhibited in the subjects' 
behaviour is significant, with 22.59% of subjects being ambiguity neutral and 
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(a) Switching Point in the Moderate Prospect Task (MP')

























Mean (5.07) +1 S.D. (8.55)-1 S.D. (1.57)
0 2 4 6 8 10
(b) Switching Point in the High Prospect Task (HP)
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(c) Switching Point in the Low Prospect Task (LP)




Figure 3.4 Distribution of Ambiguity Premium: AP minus MP 
Moreover, taking the difference of switching points in Task MP’ and Task HP, 
one can find that a considerable fraction of subjects exhibit significant common 
ratio effects (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979); that is, they are more risk averse in 
Task MP’ than in Task HP, as shown in Figure 3.5(a). A similar examination is 
also conducted on Task MP’ and Task LP, with the common ration effect 
reported by the positive values in Figure 3.5(b). 
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(a) Measure for Common Ratio Effect (CRH): MP' minus HP
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(b) Measure for Common Ratio Effect (CRL): MP' minus LP
Obs.=3236, S.D.=4.17, P25=-1, P50=0, P75=4
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3.4.1.3 Behavior in Intertemporal Settings 
Finally, let’s turn to examine the subjects’ responses to the decision tasks in 
the intertemporal settings, including the Near Future Task and the Remote 
Future Task. As discussed in the previous section, participants’ switching points 
in their responses to the intertemporal decision tasks have been taken as the 
measure for the degree of impatience – a higher score represents higher degree 
of impatience. From Figure 3.6, one can find that in the near future, from 
tomorrow to 31 days later, over 60% of the subjects required $7 as their least 
compensation for delayed payment, which means a switching point at or after 
Choice 3, while in the remote future, from 351 days later to 381 days later, 48.42% 
of the subjects could accept $1 as compensation for delayed payment. 
Furthermore, statistical tests suggest that the switching point in Remote Future 
Task is significantly earlier than in the Near Future Task. In other words, there 
are significantly more subjects who are more patient in the remote future than in 
the near future. 
Actually, this behaviour pattern, the tendency for people to increasingly 
choose a smaller-sooner reward over a larger-later reward as the delay occurs 
sooner rather than later in time, has also been well documented in the literature, 
and the difference between the least compensations required for near future and 




Figure 3.6 Graphic Illustration of Behavioral Results: Near Future vs Remote Future 
Similarly to the case of ambiguity aversion, we can take the difference of the 
switching point locations in the two tasks, and view it as a measure for near-term 
bias. As shown in Figure 3.7, the red bar indicates those who show no difference 
in discounting the near future or the remote future, while the blue bars indicate a 
considerable fraction of participants who exhibit some near-term bias.  
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(a) Near Future Task: Discounting (next day vs 31 days; $100 gain)
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(b) Remote Future Task: Discounting (351 day vs 381 days; $100 gain)
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Measure for Near-Term Bias: NFuture minus RFuture
Obs.=3398, S.D.=3.33, P25=0, P50=0, P75=3
Degree of Impatience Degree of Impatience 




3.4.1.4 Summary Statistics 
To sum up, the definition of variables and detailed descriptive statistics of the 
sample used in our following analysis are reported in Table 3.1. 
3.4.2 Correlation among Key Variables 
Beyond the descriptive statistics summarized above, we can proceed to 
examine the potential correlation among subjects' attitudes towards uncertainty 
and time through running the Spearman's rank correlation test, with the rest 
results reported in Table 3.2. 
Notable findings include 1) that the degree of near term bias shares no 
significant correlation with the degree of risk aversion in Task MP or the degree 
of uncertainty aversion in Task AP, although both of them are significantly 
negatively correlated with the degree of impatience both in the near future and in 
the remote future; 2) that the degree of near term bias is significantly positively 
correlated with the degree of risk aversion in Task MP' and Task HP, but 
negatively with that in Task AP, with the degree of risk aversion in MP', HP, and 
LP positively correlated with the degree of impatience in the near future at 10% 
significance level; 3) that the degree of near-term bias shares no significant 
correlation with the degree of ambiguity premium (AP-MP); 4) that the common 
ratio effect in both cases (CRH and CRL), which is not significantly correlated 
with the degree of impatience in the near future, is significantly correlated with 
the degree of impatience in the remote future, but with different signs; 5) that the 
degree of near-term bias is only significantly correlated with the degree of 
common ratio effect in the High Prospect Task (CRH), but not significantly in the 










Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Note 
Gender (1=M; 0=F) 3388 0.486 0.500 0 1 A dummy variable for genders: Male=1, Female=0 
City (1=SG; 0=BJ) 3458 0.635 0.481 0 1 A dummy variable for cities: Singapore=1, Beijing=0 
Round (1=R1; 0=R2) 3441 0.522 0.500 0 1 A dummy variable for rounds: Round 1=1, Round 2=0 
RPM IQ 3441 55.193 4.922 5 60 IQ test score based on Raven's Progressive Matrices 
Age 3382 21.463 1.825 16 33 Age of participant as of the date of the experiment 
MP 3170 1.910 2.464 -3 7 Risk premium in the Moderate Prospect Task (MP) 
AP 3345 4.018 2.877 -3 7 Uncertainty premium in the Ambiguous Prospect Task 
AP-MP 3139 2.162 3.108 -10 10 Ambiguity premium over gains: AP minus MP 
MP’ 3290 6.595 3.126 0 10 The switching point in the Task MP’  
HP 3300 5.067 3.494 0 10 The switching point in the High Prospect Task  
LP 3309 5.716 3.447 0 10 The switching point in the Low Prospect Task 
CRH=MP’-HP 3200 1.537 3.496 -10 10 Common ration effect (CRH): MP’ minus HP 
CRL=MP’-LP 3216 0.887 4.163 -10 10 Common ration effect (CRL): MP’ minus LP 
NFuture 3395 3.751 3.233 0 10 The switching point in the section of Near Future 
RFuture 3392 2.381 3.141 0 10 The switching point in the section of Remote Future 
Near-Term Bias 3378 1.367 3.335 -10 10 NFuture minus RFuture 
Note: In total, we have 3510 subjects, but in the table above, we excluded 32 subjects whose Raven’s Progressive Matrices IQ scores are 0 and 20 subjects  







Table 3.2 Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients among Key Variables 
 MP AP AP-MP MP’ HP LP CRH=MP’-HP CRL=MP’-LP NFuture RFuture Near-Term Bias 
MP 1           
 3170           
 (-)           
AP 0.2999* 1          
 3139 3345          
 0.000 (-)          
AP-MP -0.4483* 0.6605* 1         
 3139 3139 3139         
 0.000 0.000 (-)         
MP’ 0.3163* 0.2629* 0.0046 1        
 3088 3231 3064 3290        
 0.000 0.000 0.800 (-)        
HP 0.1918* 0.1457* -0.012 0.4542* 1.000       
 3091 3244 3067 3200 3300       
 0.000 0.000 0.524 0.000 (-)       
LP 0.1080* 0.0719* -0.0155 0.1666* -0.0061 1      
 3099 3250 3072 3216 3216 3309      
 0.000 0.000 0.390 0.000 0.731 (-)      
CRH=MP’-HP 0.0676* 0.0714* 0.023 0.3769* -0.5945* 0.1902* 1     
 3025 3157 3004 3200 3200 3139 3200     
 0.000 0.000 0.208 0.000 0.000 0.000 (-)     
CRL=MP’-LP 0.1361* 0.1273* 0.023 0.5692* 0.3468* -0.6698* 0.1131* 1    
 3034 3164 3010 3216 3139 3216 3139 3216    
 0.000 0.000 0.208 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 (-)    
NFuture -0.0371* -0.0981* -0.0476* 0.0307 0.0293 0.0328 0.0168 -0.0011 1   
 3143 3308 3113 3259 3268 3279 3174 3190 3395   
 0.038 0.000 0.008 0.079 0.094 0.060 0.343 0.951 (-)   
RFuture -0.0491* -0.0715* -0.0131 -0.018 -0.0433* 0.0941* 0.0365* -0.0837* 0.4541* 1  
 3140 3304 3109 3254 3265 3274 3169 3185 3378 3392  
 0.006 0.000 0.464 0.306 0.013 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.000 (-)  
Near-Term Bias 0.0201 -0.0218 -0.0271 0.0547* 0.0660* -0.0538* -0.0041 0.0885* 0.4996* -0.4424* 1 
 3134 3293 3104 3248 3257 3267 3164 3180 3378 3378 3378 
 0.261 0.211 0.131 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.818 0.000 0.000 0.000 (-) 
Note: (1) The first line is the Spearman's ρ, or, the Spearman rank correlation coefficient;  
  (2) The second line is the number of observations; and  
  (3) The third line is the significance level.  




3.4.3 Econometric Analysis 
Beyond the correlation analysis, we would like to conduct detailed 
investigation into the association between attitudes towards uncertainty and time, 
and directly test the three hypotheses proposed in Section 2 based on 
econometric analysis.  
3.4.3.1 Test for Hypothesis 1.A 
To test Hypothesis 1.A, we can establish an equivalent test on our 
measures of these two kinds of attitudes, with the classical linear regression 
model specified as follows.  
𝑆𝑃𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑅𝑃𝑖 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖, 𝜀|𝑅𝑃, 𝑋 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2)                           (5) 
where 𝑆𝑃𝑖  denotes the Switching Point of subject   in the two intertemporal 
decision tasks (NFuture and RFuture), 𝑅𝑃𝑖 denotes the Risk Premium of subject   
in the four risky decision tasks (MP, MP’, HP, and LP), and 𝑋𝑖 denotes a set of 
control variables, including the dummy for cities, the dummy for genders, the 
dummy for experiment rounds, ages and RPM IQ scores of subjects, as well as 
some others. Besides, to control potential unobserved factors which are common 
to the near future and the remote future, we would include the switching point in 
the remote future (RFuture) in 𝑋𝑖 when estimating the model for the near future, 
and include NFuture when estimating the model for the rear future. 
As Hypothesis 1.A says, decision makers who exhibit a relatively higher 
degree of risk aversion tend to request more compensation for delayed payment 
than those who are less risk averse. Hence, if Hypothesis 1.A is true, in the 
linear regression model with the degree of impatience being the dependent 
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variable, we expect the coefficient before risk premium to be positive; that is, 𝛼1 
is expected to be positive. 
Firstly, we estimate the model using OLS regression without controlling for 
other variables, 𝑋𝑖 , and it is found that 𝛼1  is significantly negative in MP, but 
significantly positive in MP’, HP and LP for the near future, while for the remote 
future, we only have a significantly positive 𝛼1 in LP, with all else negative. These 
findings are consistent with the Spearman’s tests in Section 4.2. Detailed results 
could be found in Table A.12 in Appendix VIII. 
Then, we estimate the model (5) again with the set of control variables 
added into the regression equation, and the OLS regression results for both the 
near future and the remote future are reported in Table 3.3. As one may note, in 
the near future, the coefficients before MP’, and HP are significantly positive, and 
this is consistent with the Spearman’s rank test; while we only have one 
significantly positive coefficient of interest in the remote future, which is the one 
before LP, with coefficients before MP, MP’, and HP all significantly negative. 
Again, however, no significance is found in MP.  
Moreover, the significantly negative coefficients before the city dummy 
across columns (1-4) of Table 3.3 indicate that our subjects in Singapore exhibit 
significantly lower degrees of impatience in the near future on average than 
subjects in China; but in the remote future as shown in columns (5-8) of Table 
3.3, subjects in Singapore exhibit significantly higher degrees of impatience on 
average than those in China. Similarly, the positive coefficients before the gender 
dummy in columns (1-4) of Table 3.3 indicate that our male subjects exhibit 
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significantly higher degrees of impatience than female subjects in the near future, 
but this is not significant in the remote future.  
Besides, the coefficients before IQ are significantly negative both in the near 
future and in the remote, which suggests that people with higher cognitive ability, 
as measured by higher IQ scores, might be more likely to persuade themselves 
to be more patient to wait a delayed payment. These findings partially confirm 
those by Burks et al. (2009) and Dohmen et al. (2010), who did not distinguish 
the near future and the remote future. 
In addition, as we expected above, as a control variable, the degree of 
impatience in the remote future is significantly powerful in explaining the degree 
of impatience in the near future, and it's similar to that in the near future to 
explain the remote future.  
To sum up, let's come back to the Hypothesis 1.A. In the moderate risky 
situation (MP), Hypothesis 1.A would be rejected, at least for the remote future 
case. In other words, the degree of people's risk aversion is significantly 
negatively correlated with people's impatience degree. Similarly, in the Task MP’ 
and HP, Hypothesis 1.A would be rejected for the remote future. Moreover, the 







Table 3.3 OLS Regression Results for Test of Hypothesis 1.A 
 Switching Point in the Near Future Task (NFuture) Switching Point in the Remote Future Task (RFuture) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Risk Premium in the Moderate Prospect Task (MP) -0.024    -0.042*    
 [0.022]    [0.021]    
Switching Point in the Moderate Prospect Task (MP')  0.063**    -0.036*   
  [0.017]    [0.016]   
Switching Point in the High Prospect Task (HP)   0.041**    -0.031*  
   [0.015]    [0.015]  
Switching Point in the Low Prospect Task (LP)    0.008    0.050** 
    [0.016]    [0.015] 
Switching Point in the Remote Future Task (RFuture) 0.488** 0.475** 0.478** 0.484**     
 [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019]     
Switching Point in the Near Future Task (NFuture)     0.445** 0.442** 0.443** 0.450** 
     [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] 
Gender Dummy: 1=Male; 0=Female 0.262* 0.321** 0.308** 0.316** -0.076 -0.043 -0.050 -0.030 
 [0.110] [0.108] [0.108] [0.108] [0.104] [0.105] [0.105] [0.104] 
City Dummy: 1=SG; 0=BJ -0.721** -0.692** -0.645** -0.669** 0.868** 0.904** 0.854** 0.795** 
 [0.108] [0.105] [0.106] [0.106] [0.100] [0.099] [0.100] [0.099] 
Ages of Subjects as of the Experiment 0.006 0.009 0.013 0.018 0.023 0.022 0.031 0.023 
 [0.030] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.028] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] 
Round Dummy: 1=Round 1, 0=Round 2 -0.091 -0.062 -0.076 -0.113 0.282** 0.250* 0.251* 0.282** 
 [0.104] [0.102] [0.102] [0.102] [0.099] [0.098] [0.098] [0.098] 
RPM IQ Score -0.037** -0.040** -0.039** -0.043** -0.025* -0.029* -0.027* -0.024* 
 [0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.012] 
Constant 4.942** 4.559** 4.565** 4.845** 0.943 1.424 1.036 0.600 
 [0.902] [0.889] [0.864] [0.896] [0.879] [0.891] [0.855] [0.895] 
R2 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.24 
Observations 3,051 3,162 3,171 3,181 3,051 3,162 3,171 3,181 
Note: (1) Standard errors are reported in the squared brackets below the estimated coefficients; 




3.4.3.2 Test for Hypothesis 1.B 
Then, let's turn to test Hypothesis 1.B. Similarly to test Hypothesis 1.A, we 
can test it based on the following linear regression model. 
𝑁𝑇𝐵𝑖 =  0 +  1𝑅𝑃𝑖 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 , 𝜇|𝑅𝑃, 𝑋 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2)                          (6) 
where 𝑁𝑇𝐵𝑖  denotes the measure of Near-Term Bias, which is the difference 
between the switching points of subject   in the near future decision task and the 
remote future task (NFuture minus RFuture), 𝑅𝑃𝑖 denotes the Risk Premium of 
subject   in the four risky decision tasks (MP, MP’, HP, and LP), and 𝑋𝑖 denotes a 
same set of control variables as in model (5). Since higher (positive) values of 
𝑁𝑇𝐵𝑖 means higher degrees of near-term bias and higher values of 𝑅𝑃𝑖 means 
higher degree of risk aversion, thus, the coefficient  1 is expected to be positive if 
Hypothesis 1.B is true. 
As reported in Table 3.4, the coefficients before MP, MP’ and HP are all 
significantly positive while that before LP is significantly negative. Moreover, 
when we add the subjects' attitudes towards risk in all of the four situations into 
the regression equation, and the negative coefficient before LP is still significant 
and the other three positive coefficients are no longer significant. In other words, 
it seems that the degree of near-term bias is most likely to be associated with the 
degree of risk aversion in various situations. More specifically, the significantly 






Table 3.4 OLS Regression Results for Test of Hypothesis 1.B 
 Near-Term Bias: NFuture minus RFuture 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Risk Premium in the Moderate Prospect Task (MP) 0.042*    0.033 
 [0.021]    [0.023] 
Switching Point in the Moderate Prospect Task (MP')  0.036*   0.026 
  [0.016]   [0.020] 
Switching Point in the High Prospect Task (HP)   0.031*  0.011 
   [0.015]  [0.017] 
Switching Point in the Low Prospect Task (LP)    -0.050** -0.055** 
    [0.015] [0.015] 
Switching Point in the Near Future Task (NFuture) 0.555** 0.558** 0.557** 0.550** 0.561** 
 [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.020] 
Gender Dummy: 1=Male; 0=Female 0.076 0.043 0.050 0.030 0.036 
 [0.104] [0.105] [0.105] [0.104] [0.108] 
City Dummy: 1=SG; 0=BJ -0.868** -0.904** -0.854** -0.795** -0.777** 
 [0.100] [0.099] [0.100] [0.099] [0.105] 
Ages of Subjects as of the Experiment -0.023 -0.022 -0.031 -0.023 -0.024 
 [0.028] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] 
Round Dummy: 1=Round 1, 0=Round 2 -0.282** -0.250* -0.251* -0.282** -0.287** 
 [0.099] [0.098] [0.098] [0.098] [0.102] 
RPM IQ Score 0.025* 0.029* 0.027* 0.024* 0.021 
 [0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.012] [0.013] 
Constant -0.943 -1.424 -1.036 -0.600 -0.677 
 [0.879] [0.891] [0.855] [0.895] [0.958] 
R2 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.33 
Observations 3,051 3,162 3,171 3,181 2,864 
Note: (1) Standard errors are reported in the squared brackets below the estimated coefficients; 




Besides, the results in Table 3.4 also indicate that 1) the degree of near-term 
bias is positively associated with the degree of impatience in the near future; 2) 
the subjects in Singapore seem to exhibit lower degree of near-term bias than 
those in Beijing on average, from the significantly negative coefficients before the 
city dummy across columns (1-5), which is consistent with the earlier observation 
that the Singapore subjects exhibit significantly lower degrees of impatience in 
the near future but significantly higher degrees of impatience in the remote future; 
and 3) the correlation between the IQ score and the degree of near-term bias 
people is still significantly positive. 
3.4.3.3 Test for Hypothesis 2 
Next, we will move onwards to test Hypothesis 2.using a similar strategy, 
for which a linear regression model is specified as follows. 
𝑁𝑇𝐵𝑖 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑅𝑖 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 , 𝜇|𝐶𝑅, 𝑋 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2)                          (7) 
where 𝑁𝑇𝐵𝑖 denotes the measure of Near-Term Bias, which is defined the same 
as above in model (6), 𝐶𝑅𝑖 denotes the degree of Common Ratio effect, which is 
defined as the difference between the switching point of subject   in Task MP’ 
and the switching point in Task HP or LP, and 𝑋𝑖  denotes a set of control 
variables, including the dummy for cities, the dummy for genders, the dummy for 
experiment rounds, ages and RPM IQ scores of subjects, as well as all kinds of 
risky decision situations. 
If Hypothesis 2 is true, the coefficient 𝛾1  is expected to be positive. As 
shown in Table 3.5, the coefficient 𝛾1 is significantly positive in the Low Prospect 





Table 3.5 OLS Regression Results for Test of Hypothesis 2 
 Near-Term Bias: NFuture minus RFuture 
Common Ratio Effect (CRH): MP' minus HP Common Ratio Effect (CRL): MP' minus LP 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Common Ratio Effect (CRH): MP' minus HP 0.007 -0.002 0.025 0.021     
 [0.018] [0.015] [0.018] [0.020]     
Common Ratio Effect (CRL): MP' minus LP     0.057** 0.052** 0.045** 0.021 
     [0.015] [0.012] [0.016] [0.020] 
Switching Point in the Near Future Task (NFuture)  0.563** 0.561** 0.566**  0.553** 0.554** 0.566** 
  [0.019] [0.019] [0.020]  [0.019] [0.019] [0.020] 
Switching Point in the High Prospect Task (HP)   0.045* 0.034    0.013 
   [0.018] [0.020]    [0.017] 
Risk Premium in the Moderate Prospect Task (MP)    0.023    0.023 
    [0.024]    [0.024] 
Uncertainty Premium in the Ambiguous Prospect Task (AP)    0.025    0.025 
    [0.020]    [0.020] 
Switching Point in the Low Prospect Task (LP)    -0.056**   -0.012 -0.035 
    [0.016]   [0.020] [0.023] 
Gender Dummy: 1=Male; 0=Female 0.250 0.041 0.052 0.051 0.242 0.037 0.032 0.051 
 [0.128] [0.106] [0.107] [0.108] [0.127] [0.105] [0.106] [0.108] 
City Dummy: 1=SG; 0=BJ -1.067** -0.887** -0.882** -0.783** -0.981** -0.815** -0.807** -0.783** 
 [0.125] [0.101] [0.101] [0.105] [0.122] [0.100] [0.100] [0.105] 
Ages of Subjects as of the Experiment -0.020 -0.033 -0.032 -0.027 -0.005 -0.020 -0.021 -0.027 
 [0.035] [0.029] [0.029] [0.030] [0.035] [0.029] [0.029] [0.030] 
Round Dummy: 1=Round 1, 0=Round 2 -0.201 -0.243* -0.246* -0.282** -0.249* -0.283** -0.283** -0.282** 
 [0.119] [0.100] [0.099] [0.102] [0.118] [0.099] [0.099] [0.102] 
RPM IQ Score -0.010 0.028* 0.027* 0.021 -0.015 0.025* 0.024 0.021 
 [0.014] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.015] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013] 
Constant 2.987** -0.890 -1.136 -0.667 2.893** -1.008 -0.928 -0.667 
 [1.036] [0.885] [0.892] [0.964] [1.062] [0.910] [0.923] [0.964] 
R2 0.03 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.03 0.32 0.32 0.33 
Observations 3,079 3,079 3,079 2,843 3,095 3,095 3,095 2,843 
Note: (1) Standard errors are reported in the squared brackets below the estimated coefficients; 




3.4.3.4 Test for Hypothesis 3 
Lastly, we test Hypothesis 3.using a similar strategy, with a linear 
regression model specified as follows. 
𝑁𝑇𝐵𝑖 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝐴𝑀𝐵𝑖 + 𝜒𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖, 𝜇|𝐴𝑀𝐵, 𝑋 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2)                          (8) 
where 𝑁𝑇𝐵𝑖 denotes the measure of Near-Term Bias, which is defined the same 
as above in model (6), 𝐴𝑀𝐵𝑖 denotes the degree of AMBiguity aversion, which is 
defined as the difference between the uncertainty premium of subject   in the 
Ambiguous Prospect Task (AP) and the risk premium in the Moderate Prospect 
Task (MP), and 𝑋𝑖 denotes the same set of control variables.  
If Hypothesis 3 is true, the coefficient 𝜹𝟏  is expected to be positive. 
However, the estimated coefficients are not significantly different from 0, as 
shown in Table 3.6, which means that Hypothesis 3 cannot get any significant 
support from our experiment. 
Table 3.6 OLS Regression Results for Test of Hypothesis 3 
 Near-Term Bias: NFuture minus RFuture 
(1) (2) (3) 
Ambiguity Premium: AP-MP -0.011 0.008 0.031 
 [0.019] [0.017] [0.019] 
Risk Premium in the Moderate Prospect Task (MP)   0.060* 
   [0.024] 
Switching Point in the Near Future Task (NFuture)  0.556** 0.559** 
  [0.019] [0.019] 
Gender Dummy: 1=Male; 0=Female 0.243 0.075 0.099 
 [0.127] [0.105] [0.105] 
City Dummy: 1=SG; 0=BJ -1.082** -0.889** -0.878** 
 [0.124] [0.101] [0.101] 
Ages of Subjects as of the Experiment -0.013 -0.028 -0.028 
 [0.035] [0.029] [0.029] 
Round Dummy: 1=Round 1, 0=Round 2 -0.242* -0.282** -0.282** 
 [0.119] [0.099] [0.099] 
RPM IQ Score -0.010 0.025* 0.025* 
 [0.014] [0.012] [0.012] 
Constant 2.930** -0.795 -0.957 
 [1.039] [0.882] [0.887] 
R2 0.03 0.32 0.32 
Observations 3,021 3,021 3,021 
Note: (1) Standard errors are reported in the squared brackets below the estimated coefficients; 
(2) * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
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3.5 Robustness Checks 
3.5.1 Alternative Econometric Analysis Approach 
The econometric analysis part is only based on OLS regression approach. 
To test the robustness of the OLS regression results, we can also try the two- 
limit Tobit modelling approach, whose latent form specification is expected to 
help control for the two-limit censoring property of the experimental data. 
Taking model (5) as an example, we can modify the linear specification to 
the latent form specification as follows. 
𝑆𝐼𝑖
∗ = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑅𝑃𝑖 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 , 𝜀|𝑅𝑃, 𝑋 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2)                          (9) 
where  
𝑆𝐼𝑖 = {
𝑎1,               𝑆𝐼𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝑎1         
𝑆𝐼𝑖
∗,               𝑎1 < 𝑆𝐼𝑖
∗ < 𝑎2
𝑎2,               𝑆𝐼𝑖
∗ ≥ 𝑎2          
, 𝑎1 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎2 = 10 in our data. 
The estimation results for the two-limit Tobit model are reported in Table 
A.13. As one may notice, there is only one slight changes in the estimation 
results; that is, the coefficient before MP is not significantly different from zero 
any more in the model for the remote future, column (5) in Table A.13. 
Given the similar censoring property in the data for near-term bias, models 
(6-8) can also be modified to this two-limit Tobit model, with the estimation 
results reported in Table A.14, Table A.15, and Table A.16. Comparing results of 
the linear model and the Tobit model, we do not see any obvious change in the 
signs as well as significance of the parameters in the Tobit model. 
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Moreover, we can introduce a dummy variable for the near-term bias, 
denoted by 𝑫_𝑵𝑻𝑩𝒊, so that we can also test the potential correlation between 
people's attitudes towards ambiguity and the likelihood to exhibit near-term bias, 
based on a Probit model in the following latent form. The estimation results for 
model (6) and model (7) are reported in Table A.17 and Table A.16. 
𝑁𝑇𝐵𝑖
∗ =  0 +  1𝑅𝑃𝑖 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 , 𝜇|𝑆𝑈, 𝑋 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2)                          (10) 
where  
𝐷_𝑁𝑇𝐵𝑖 =  
1,    𝑁𝑇𝐵𝑖
∗ > 0
0,    𝑁𝑇𝐵𝑖
∗ ≤ 0
 
Again, comparing the estimation results of the linear model and the Probit 
model for the likelihood to exhibit near-term bias, we do not find obvious 
difference. 
Alternatively, we can also try other discrete ordered response modelling 
approaches, including the ordered Probit model, as well as the quantile 
regression models, and again, no obvious changes in the significance of the 
signs of interest are observed in the estimation results, except that some 
insignificant coefficients or significant coefficients but with the opposite signs are 
found in some relatively low quantiles, like 10% or 20% quantiles. Overall, we 
can still argue that the pervious findings are robust to various econometric 
analysis approaches we have tried.  
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3.5.2 Alternative Measures for Preferences 
Although we may avoid potential estimation bias resulting from 
misspecification of utility functions by taking the strategy of using the switching 
points on the multiple price lists as measures of people's attitudes towards 
uncertainty and time, which does not rely on the utility function, we can still make 
use of other alternative measures for the attitudes to test the robustness of our 
results.  
One alternative measure for the subjects' attitudes towards uncertainty is the 
so-called uncertainty premium, which is the difference between the expected 
payoff of the fixed uncertain option and the certainty equivalence of the subject 
with respect to the risky option, which is the switching point from Option A to 
Option B on the uncertainty price list. Moreover, for the intertemporal situations, 
either in NFuture or RFuture, as we have discussed in Section 3, we can take the 
differences in the amounts of money between Option A and Option B at the 
switching point on the time price list as the least compensation required by 
subjects for delayed payment, which is an alternative measure of the subjects' 
impatience degree. Then, we replace the switching point measures in previous 
analysis by the uncertainty premium and the least compensation and the results 
do not undermine the validity of previous results, but seem to provide stronger 
support to the previous results. 
Besides, we also try another bundle of alternative measures for our subjects' 
attitudes towards uncertainty and time. More specifically, we calculate the 
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) in each uncertain situation for each 
subject based on the switching point from Option A to Option B on the 
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uncertainty price list, which point could be regarded as the certainty equivalence 
of the subject with respect to the risky option, and their discounting rates for both 
the near future and the remote future based on the switching point from Option A 
to Option B on the time price lists. The calculation methods for CRRA and 
discounting rates are described in Appendix VI and Appendix I. Again, by 
replacing the switching point measures in the previous analysis by CRRA and 
discounting rates, we find no significant change in the sign of coefficients in the 
new results, comparing with those obtained based on the other two bunches of 
measures.  
3.6 Discussion with Concluding Remarks 
Focusing on people's attitudes towards uncertainty and time, we examine 
the interrelation between them in this paper. In particular, based on a thorough 
review of the conceptual background, we propose and test three main 
hypotheses based on a large-sample experiment: (1.A) the more risk averse a 
decision maker is in risky situations, the more impatient he/she is in intertemporal 
settings; (1.B) the more risk averse a decision maker is in risky situations, the 
greater near-term bias he/she would exhibit; (2) the stronger common ratio effect 
a decision maker exhibits, the greater near-term bias he/she would exhibit; and 
(3) the more ambiguity averse a decision maker is, the greater near-term bias 
he/she would exhibit. On one hand, Hypothesis 1.A is supported in the near 
future, but gets rejected in the remote future; on the other hand, Hypothesis 1.B 
is supported from three of the four risky situations in our experiment, suggesting 
that people's risk aversion degree moderate risky situations is significantly 
positively associated with the degree of near-term bias people may exhibit when 
faced with decision situations involving different time delays. Furthermore, when 
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we come to the Hypothesis 2, the experiment result in skewed risky decision 
situations (CRL) turns out to provide significant support to the hypothesis, but the 
result in moderate risky decision situations (CRH) does not. Besides, Hypothesis 
3 cannot get any significant support from our experiment. In addition, it is also 
found that people's IQ value is significantly negatively associated with the degree 
of impatience both in the near future and in the remote future as well as the 
degree of near-term bias. These findings are robust to various econometric 
analysis approaches, various measures of the two kinds of attitudes as well as a 
replication study.  
From the perspective of literature, we are contributing to the growing 
literature on the correlations between preferences over uncertainty and 
preferences over time in the several ways. Firstly, we are adding new evidence 
on the correlation between preferences over risk and preferences over time. In 
particular, the signs of our results in the remote future are in line with Anderhub 
et al. (2001) and Sutter et al. (2013), but contradict with Andersen et al. (2008), 
while in the near future, we have the reversal signs. Secondly, and more 
importantly, we are among the first few studies focusing on the interaction 
between people's attitudes towards ambiguity and time. It seems that we do not 
have any significant support to the intuition that time is a source of uncertainty, 
especially ambiguity. Therefore, it might be necessary to reconsider whether it is 
appropriate to view time as a source of ambiguity and to figure out the source of 
near-term bias. Moreover, the findings in the significant association between 
RPM IQ scores and the degree of impatience as well as the degree of near-term 
bias enrich the growing literature upon the relationship between time preferences 
 95 
 
and cognitive skills as well as personalities (See Burks et al. (2009); Dohmen et 
al. (2010)). 
But there are still several points related with attitudes towards uncertainty 
and time that we have not touched in this paper, including loss aversion, 
preferences over resolution of uncertainty, and so on. Moreover, we have not 
answered the questions, like, is it possible that people who are more uncertainty 
averse would show more impatience in situations with uncertainty and time 
involved simultaneously? Is there any attitude dominating others when people 
make decisions in some situations? Is it possible that one kind of attitude is 
endogenous in another? Should the different kinds of attitudes be treated 
separately or jointly?  
Besides, although we have obtained the significant association between 
people’s attitudes towards uncertainty and time, this finding is based on 
measures of these attitudes elicited from separate decision tasks, which 
suggests that the test of the association is indirect. Hence, including a rigorous 
treatment of implicit uncertainty in the decision tasks seems necessary and 
natural to directly test the interaction between these two kinds of attitudes. 
Moreover, a measure of uncertainty, or ambiguity, perceived from the length of 
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Appendix I Calculation of Discounting Rates 
 
Given our experiment design, to calculate the discounting rate, we can 
assume that the future value of the payment in Option A equals to the payment in 




where 𝒙𝟏 is the payment in Option A, 𝒙𝟏 is the payoff at the switching point in 
Option B, and 𝜹 is the discounting rate for one month in our tasks, NFuture and 
RFuture. And subjects’ discounting rates corresponding to different switching 
points in each of the two tasks are summarized in Table A.1. 
Table A.1 Discounting Rates for One Month in Tasks NFuture and RFuture 
 Location of the Switching Point 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Option A 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Option B 101 104 107 110 113 116 119 122 125 128 









Appendix II Two-Limit Tobit Regression Results for Chapter 1 
 
Table A.2 Tobit Regression Results for the Near Future 
  The Degree of Impatience in the Near Future (NFuture) 
        (1)      (2)       (3)       (4)       (5) 
Modell RARA_LN 0.443 -0.667 -0.670 -0.562 -0.375 
  (0.47) (0.81) (0.81) (0.69) (0.46) 
 RFuture  0.681*** 0.687*** 0.654*** 0.653*** 
   (7.47) (7.53) (7.19) (7.22) 
 Gender (1=M)   0.538 0.552 0.036 
    (0.93) (0.96) (0.06) 
 IQ    -0.178** -0.173** 
     (2.14) (2.09) 
 Age     0.341 
      (1.60) 
 Constant -2.168 6.495 6.226 15.280* 6.251 
  (0.25) (0.86) (0.82) (1.78) (0.61) 
Sigma Constant 4.752*** 4.104*** 4.090*** 4.035*** 4.009*** 
  (14.68) (14.83) (14.83) (14.84) (14.84) 
Observation Summary      
 Left-censored observations at MP<=0 81 81 81 81 81 
 Uncensored observations 135 135 135 135 135 
 Right-censored observations at MP>=10 13 13 13 13 13 
(1) Student t-statistics are reported in the parentheses; 










Table A.3 Tobit Regression Results for the Remote Future 
  The Degree of Impatience in the Remote Future (RFuture) 
        (1)      (2)       (3)       (4)       (5) 
Modell RARA_LN 3.962** 3.901*** 3.832*** 3.901*** 3.848*** 
  (2.56) (2.89) (2.87) (2.93) (2.86) 
 RFuture  1.171*** 1.177*** 1.141*** 1.144*** 
   (7.17) (7.24) (6.98) (6.99) 
 Gender (1=M)   -1.495 -1.453 -1.315 
    (1.64) (1.60) (1.28) 
 IQ    -0.156 -0.157 
     (1.20) (1.22) 
 Age     -0.094 
      (0.28) 
 Constant -37.075** -39.880*** -38.468*** -30.307** -27.816* 
  (2.58) (3.16) (3.08) (2.16) (1.68) 
Sigma Constant 7.075*** 5.922*** 5.867*** 5.841*** 5.836*** 
  (11.29) (11.51) (11.51) (11.52) (11.52) 
Observation Summary      
 Left-censored observations at MP<=0 122 122 122 122 122 
 Uncensored observations 89 89 89 89 89 
 Right-censored observations at MP>=10 18 18 18 18 18 
(1) Student t-statistics are reported in the parentheses; 










Table A.4 Tobit Regression Results for the Near-Term Bias 
  The Degree of Near-Term Bias (NFuture minus RFuture) 
        (1)      (2)       (3)       (4)       (5) 
Modell RARA_LN -1.413 -1.381 -1.368 -1.249 -1.412 
  (2.31)** (2.28)** (2.25)** (2.04)** (2.61)*** 
 Gender (1=M)  0.767 0.772 0.422 0.469 
   (1.75)* (1.76)* (0.84) (1.05) 
 IQ   -0.032 -0.028 0.072 
    (0.48) (0.43) (1.23) 
 Age    0.230 0.122 
     (1.38) (0.83) 
 NFuture     0.524 
      (8.00)*** 
 Constant 13.571 12.878 14.516 8.514 5.156 
  (2.41)** (2.29)** (2.22)** (1.09) (0.74) 
Sigma Constant 3.325 3.303 3.302 3.289 2.906 
  (20.66)*** (20.66)*** (20.66)*** (20.66)*** (20.69)*** 
Observation Summary      
 Left-censored observations at MP<=-10 4 4 4 4 4 
 Uncensored observations 220 220 220 220 220 
 Right-censored observations at MP>=10 5 5 5 5 5 
(1) Student t-statistics are reported in the parentheses; 





Appendix III Experimental Design for Chapter 2 
 























Appendix IV About the Candidate Genes 
 
Table A.5 The List of Candidate Genes in the Present Study 
Short Name Full Name Gene ID Location URL 
ADRB1 Adrenoceptor beta 1 [ Homo sapiens (human) ] 153 Chromosome 10, NC_000010.11 
(114044047..114046908) 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/gene/153  
AR Androgen receptor [ Homo sapiens (human) ] 367 Chromosome X, NC_000023.11 (67544032..67730619) http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/gene/367 
AVPR1A Arginine vasopressin receptor 1A [ Homo sapiens (human) ] 552 Chromosome 12, NC_000012.12 (63142287..63153860, 
complement) 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/gene/552 
COMT Catechol-O-methyltransferase [ Homo sapiens (human) ] 1312 Chromosome 22, NC_000022.11 
(19941740..19969975) 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/gene/1312 
ERBB3 ERB-b2 receptor tyrosine kinase 3 [ Homo sapiens (human) ] 2065 Chromosome 12, NC_000012.12 
(56080025..56103507) 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/gene/2065 
ESR1 Estrogen receptor 1 [ Homo sapiens (human) ] 2099 Chromosome 6, NC_000006.12 
(151690496..152103274) 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/gene/2099 
ESR2 Estrogen receptor 2 (ER beta) [ Homo sapiens (human) ] 2100 Chromosome 14, NC_000014.9 (64172925..64338550, 
complement) 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/gene/2100 
HTR2A 5-Hydroxytryptamine (serotonin) receptor 2A, G protein-
coupled [ Homo sapiens (human) ] 
3356 Chromosome 13, NC_000013.11 (46831542..46897076, 
complement) 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/gene/3356 
MAOA Monoamine Oxidase A [ Homo sapiens (human) ] 4128 Chromosome X, NC_000023.11 (43654907..43746824) http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/gene/4128 
NRG1 Nuclear receptor subfamily 3, group C, member 1 
(glucocorticoid receptor) [ Homo sapiens (human) ] 








Appendix V Robustness Checks for Chapter 2 
 
Table A.6 Tobit Regression Results for the Moderate Prospect Task (MP) 
  
Switching Point in the Moderate Prospect Task (MP) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Model         
 ERBB3 0.714*   0.786**   0.655 
  (1.88)   (2.09)   (1.58) 
 ESR1  1.276**   1.252**  0.666 
   (2.38)   (2.37)  (1.11) 
 HTR2A   0.524*   0.546* 0.526* 
    (1.84)   (1.96) (1.87) 
 Gender (1=M)    0.626 0.600 0.834 0.696 
     (1.20) (1.16) (1.57) (1.31) 
 IQ    -0.152** -0.141** -0.161** -0.175** 
     (2.23) (2.09) (2.34) (2.55) 
 Age    0.064 0.073 0.055 0.086 
     (0.38) (0.43) (0.33) (0.52) 
 Constant 2.424 -1.393 3.765*** 8.939* 4.783 11.096** 5.235 
  (1.55) (0.49) (4.57) (1.66) (0.81) (2.11) (0.83) 
Sigma Constant 3.395*** 3.372*** 3.315*** 3.334*** 3.316*** 3.235*** 3.212*** 
  (17.79) (17.85) (17.13) (17.81) (17.86) (17.15) (17.10) 
Observation Summary        
 Left-censored observations at MP<=0 17 17 16 17 17 16 16 
 Uncensored observations 180 181 166 180 181 166 165 
 Right-censored observations at MP>=10 28 28 23 28 28 23 23 
(1) Student t-statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; 








Table A.7 Tobit Regression Results for the Moderate Hazard Task (MH) 
  
Switching Point in the Moderate Hazard Task (MH) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Model     
 HTR2A 0.626 0.540 0.325 
  (1.57) (1.38) (0.83) 
 Gender (1=M)  -1.307* -1.483** 
   (1.74) (2.00) 
 IQ  0.005 0.026 
   (0.06) (0.28) 
 Age  -0.295 -0.318 
   (1.26) (1.39) 
 A1   0.304** 
    (2.51) 
 Constant 5.604*** 12.517* 10.990 
  (4.86) (1.73) (1.52) 
Sigma Constant 4.473*** 4.363*** 4.269*** 
  (14.04) (14.07) (14.03) 
Observation Summary    
 Left-censored observations at MH<=0 13 13 13 
 Uncensored observations 124 123 123 
 Right-censored observations at MH>=10 63 63 62 
(1) Student t-statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; 









Table A.8 Tobit Regression Results for the Ambiguous Prospect Task (AP) 
  
Switching Point in the Ambiguous Prospect Task (AP) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Model         
 ADRB1 0.832*   0.912**   0.792* 
  (1.97)   (2.14)   (1.83) 
 AVPR1A  -1.231*   -1.212*  -1.248* 
   (1.92)   (1.90)  (1.81) 
 ESR1   1.438*   1.388* 2.307** 
    (1.87)   (1.82) (2.45) 
 Gender (1=M)    1.068 0.813 0.776 0.959 
     (1.33) (1.06) (1.00) (1.20) 
 IQ    0.017 0.003 -0.002 0.037 
     (0.17) (0.03) (0.02) (0.37) 
 Age    -0.310 -0.347 -0.327 -0.274 
     (1.20) (1.40) (1.31) (1.06) 
 Constant -1.025 8.803** -6.291 3.835 15.484* 0.643 -2.243 
  (0.82)) (2.25) (1.54) (0.49) (1.86) (0.07) (0.23) 
Sigma Constant 4.678*** 4.665*** 4.679*** 4.648*** 4.635*** 4.652*** 4.592*** 
  (13.26) (13.84) (13.84) (13.27) (13.85) (13.84) (13.23) 
Observation Summary        
 Left-censored observations at AP<=0 87 95 95 87 95 95 87 
 Uncensored observations 113 123 123 113 123 123 112 
 Right-censored observations at AP>=10 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
(1) Student t-statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; 








Table A.9 Tobit Regression Results for the Ambiguous Hazard Task (AH) 
  Switching Point in the Ambiguous Hazard Task (AH) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Model             
 AR 1.271*     1.268*     0.796 
  (1.69)     (1.68)     (0.88) 
 AVPR1A  1.965**     1.893**    1.517 
   (2.37)     (2.29)    (1.57) 
 HTR2A   1.434***     1.444***   1.035* 
    (2.63)     (2.66)   (1.88) 
 MAOA    -0.790**     -0.699*  -0.927** 
     (2.17)     (1.89)  (2.54) 
 NRG1     1.181     1.092 1.345 
      (1.61)     (1.50) (1.54) 
 Gender (1=M)      -0.209 -0.061 -0.236 -0.006 -0.200 0.223 
       (0.20) (0.06) (0.22) (0.01) (0.19) (0.21) 
 IQ      0.254* 0.239* 0.212 0.207 0.242* 0.131 
       (1.91) (1.82) (1.59) (1.55) (1.86) (1.01) 
 Age      0.157 0.011 0.135 -0.036 0.090 -0.001 
       (0.43) (0.03) (0.38) (0.10) (0.26) (0.00) 
 Constant -0.343 -5.972 1.882 9.688*** -2.477 -17.770 -19.116* -12.761 -1.579 -17.208 -23.339* 
  (0.09) (1.17) (1.19) (5.65) (0.47) (1.52) (1.68) (1.19) (0.14) (1.49) (1.80) 
Sigma Constant 6.190*** 6.121*** 5.989*** 6.096*** 6.099*** 6.131*** 6.072*** 5.943*** 6.061*** 6.046*** 5.640*** 
  (13.28) (13.35) (12.80) (13.18) (13.47) (13.29) (13.36) (12.80) (13.19) (13.48) (12.73) 
Observation Summary            
 Left-censored observations at AP<=0 40 40 37 38 40 40 40 37 38 40 35 
 Uncensored observations 118 119 109 116 121 118 119 109 116 121 107 
 Right-censored observations at AP>=10 62 62 54 61 62 62 62 54 61 62 53 
(1) Student t-statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; 




Appendix VI Calculation of CRRA 
As an alternative measure for our subjects' attitudes towards uncertainty, the 
relative risk aversion (RRA) for each subject could be calculated based on the 
switching point from Option A to Option B on the uncertainty price list, which 
point could be regarded as the certainty equivalence of the subject with respect 
to the risky option. More specifically, we can assume the utility function 𝒖(∙) takes 













,  𝑜𝑟 𝑥 < 0
 




the gain domain (𝑥 > 0), we have𝑅𝑅𝐴𝑢 = 𝛾 , which is a constant. Moreover, 
decision makers with positive 𝛾 are risk averse, those with negative 𝛾 are risk 
loving, and zero 𝛾 means risk neutrality. Moreover, for positive 𝛾, the higher the 
value it is, the more risk averse the decision maker is.  
Similarly, we also have a constant 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝑢 = 𝛿 in the loss domain (𝑥 < 0), but 
decision makers with positive 𝜹 are risk loving, those with negative 𝜹 are risk 
averse, and zero 𝜹 means risk neutrality. And for positive 𝜹 means, the higher 
the value it is, the more risk loving the decision maker is. 
And hence the subject's constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) could be 
given by the following equation:  
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𝑃1𝑢(𝑥1) + 𝑃2𝑢(𝑥2) = 𝑢(𝐶𝐸) 
where 𝑃1 is the probability of the first outcome with payoff of 𝒙𝟏 in Option A, 𝑃2 is 
the probability of the second outcome with payoff of 𝒙𝟐 in Option A, 𝑪𝑬 denotes 
the payoff of the switching point from Option A to Option B in the series of 
choices.  
For example, one subject's response to the task MP is as shown in Table 








It follows that 𝛾 = 0. 08 . 










Similarly, we can calculate subjects CRRAs with different switching points in 
each of the four decision tasks in uncertain situations, which are summarized in 
Table A 11.  
Table A 11 CRRAs for Tasks MP, MH, AP, and AH 
 
Location of the Switching Point (Certainty Equivalence) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Task MP >0.5 0.5000 0.3972 0.2771 0.2083 0.1319 0.0466 0.0000 -0.0497 -0.1594 <-0.1594 
Task MH <-0.1027 -0.1027 -0.0600 -0.0195 0.0000 0.0190 0.0556 0.0905 0.1238 0.1557 >1.557 
Task AP >0.5 0.5000 0.3972 0.2771 0.2083 0.1319 0.0466 0.0000 -0.0497 -0.1594 <-0.1594 
Task AH <-0.1027 0.5000 0.3972 0.2771 0.2083 0.1319 0.0466 0.0000 -0.0497 -0.1594 >1.557 
Note: (1) In Task MP and Task AP, decision makers with positive CRRA are risks averse, those with negative CRRA are risk loving, and 
zero CRRA means risk neutrality. And for positive CRRA, the higher the value it is, the more risk averse the decision maker is.  
(2) In Task MH and Task AH, decision makers with positive CRRA are risks loving, those with negative CRRA are risk averse, and 




Appendix VII Experimental Design for Chapter 3 
 

































Appendix VIII Supplementary Analysis Results for Chapter 3 
 
Table A.12 Regression Results for Test of Hypothesis 1.A (No Control) 
 Switching Point in the Near Future Task (NFuture) Switching Point in the Remote Future Task (RFuture) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Risk Premium in the Moderate Prospect Task (MP) -0.063*    -0.076**    
 [0.025]    [0.024]    
Switching Point in the Moderate Prospect Task (MP')  0.047*    -0.004   
  [0.019]    [0.018]   
Switching Point in the High Prospect Task (HP)   0.033*    -0.024  
   [0.017]    [0.016]  
Switching Point in the Low Prospect Task (LP)    0.030    0.090** 
    [0.017]    [0.016] 
Constant 3.816** 3.424** 3.544** 3.556** 2.451** 2.390** 2.465** 1.846** 
 [0.077] [0.134] [0.101] [0.115] [0.075] [0.131] [0.099] [0.103] 
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Observations 3,143 3,259 3,268 3,279 3,140 3,254 3,265 3,274 
Note: (1) Standard errors are reported in the squared brackets below the estimated coefficients; 







Table A.13 Tobit Regression Results for Test of Hypothesis 1.A 
  Switching Point in the Near Future Task (NFuture) Switching Point in the Remote Future Task (RFuture) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Model Risk Premium in the Moderate Prospect Task (MP) -0.040    -0.077    
  [0.032]    [0.044]    
 Switching Point in the Moderate Prospect Task (MP')  0.107**    -0.074*   
   [0.024]    [0.034]   
 Switching Point in the High Prospect Task (HP)   0.064**    -0.075*  
    [0.022]    [0.031]  
 Switching Point in the Low Prospect Task (LP)    0.023    0.110** 
     [0.022]    [0.032] 
 Switching Point in the Remote Future Task (RFuture) 0.703** 0.681** 0.687** 0.693**     
  [0.026] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025]     
 Switching Point in the Near Future Task (NFuture)     0.898** 0.884** 0.891** 0.899** 
      [0.036] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] 
 Gender Dummy: 1=Male; 0=Female 0.277 0.370* 0.356* 0.370* -0.327 -0.250 -0.276 -0.227 
  [0.163] [0.159] [0.159] [0.159] [0.229] [0.225] [0.225] [0.224] 
 City Dummy: 1=SG; 0=BJ -1.271** -1.217** -1.152** -1.204** 1.527** 1.602** 1.495** 1.333** 
  [0.162] [0.157] [0.157] [0.159] [0.228] [0.222] [0.222] [0.225] 
 Ages of Subjects as of the Experiment 0.009 0.013 0.019 0.025 0.081 0.082 0.101 0.082 
  [0.045] [0.043] [0.044] [0.044] [0.063] [0.061] [0.062] [0.061] 
 Round Dummy: 1=Round 1, 0=Round 2 -0.153 -0.105 -0.118 -0.179 0.739** 0.651** 0.678** 0.717** 
  [0.154] [0.151] [0.151] [0.150] [0.216] [0.212] [0.213] [0.212] 
 RPM IQ Score -0.057** -0.060** -0.057** -0.062** -0.069** -0.075** -0.072** -0.066** 
  [0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.023] [0.022] [0.021] [0.023] 
 Constant 5.494** 4.725** 4.732** 5.140** -2.117 -1.327 -2.016 -2.929 
  [1.326] [1.285] [1.278] [1.300] [1.848] [1.797] [1.784] [1.820] 
Sigma Constant 4.041** 4.027** 4.039** 4.022** 5.241** 5.260** 5.263** 5.246** 
  [0.070] [0.068] [0.068] [0.068] [0.117] [0.114] [0.115] [0.114] 
Observation Summary         
 Left-censored observations at NFuture (RFuture) <=0 725 732 745 745 1502 1526 1545 1545 
 Uncensored observations 2004 2093 2090 2098 1320 1391 1386 1391 
 Right-censored observations at NFuture (RFuture) >=10 322 337 336 338 229 229 240 245 
Note: (1) Standard errors are reported in the squared brackets below the estimated coefficients; 







Table A.14 Tobit Regression Results for Test of Hypothesis 1.B 
  Near-Term Bias (NTB): NFuture minus RFuture 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model Risk Premium in the Moderate Prospect Task (MP) 0.047*    
  [0.021]    
 Switching Point in the Moderate Prospect Task (MP')  0.039*   
   [0.017]   
 Switching Point in the High Prospect Task (HP)   0.035*  
    [0.015]  
 Switching Point in the Low Prospect Task (LP)    -0.054** 
     [0.015] 
 Switching Point in the Near Future Task (NFuture) 0.587** 0.590** 0.588** 0.581** 
  [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] 
 Gender Dummy: 1=Male; 0=Female 0.088 0.054 0.060 0.039 
  [0.110] [0.110] [0.109] [0.109] 
 City Dummy: 1=SG; 0=BJ -0.891** -0.932** -0.876** -0.814** 
  [0.109] [0.107] [0.107] [0.108] 
 Ages of Subjects as of the Experiment -0.025 -0.024 -0.033 -0.026 
  [0.031] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] 
 Round Dummy: 1=Round 1, 0=Round 2 -0.303** -0.267** -0.267** -0.300** 
  [0.104] [0.103] [0.103] [0.102] 
 RPM IQ Score 0.025* 0.030** 0.028* 0.024* 
  [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] 
 Constant -1.000 -1.489 -1.111 -0.597 
  [0.906] [0.896] [0.885] [0.900] 
Sigma Constant 2.841** 2.884** 2.873** 2.864** 
  [0.038] [0.038] [0.038] [0.037] 
Observation Summary     
 Left-censored observations at NFuture<=-10 32 36 35 32 
 Uncensored observations 2898 2999 3010 3023 
 Right-censored observations at NFuture >=10 121 127 126 126 
Note: (1) Standard errors are reported in the squared brackets below the estimated coefficients; 







Table A.15 Tobit Regression Results for Test of Hypothesis 2 
  Near-Term Bias: NFuture minus RFuture 
 Common Ratio Effect (CRH): MP' minus HP Common Ratio Effect (CRL): MP' minus LP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Model Common Ratio Effect (CRH): MP' minus HP 0.006 -0.004 0.026 0.020     
  [0.018] [0.015] [0.019] [0.021]     
 Common Ratio Effect (CRL): MP' minus LP     0.060** 0.056** 0.048** 0.020 
      [0.015] [0.013] [0.017] [0.021] 
 Switching Point in the Near Future Task (NFuture)  0.595** 0.593** 0.598**  0.585** 0.585** 0.598** 
   [0.016] [0.016] [0.017]  [0.016] [0.016] [0.017] 
 Switching Point in the High Prospect Task (HP)   0.050** 0.038    0.018 
    [0.019] [0.020]    [0.017] 
 Risk Premium in the Moderate Prospect Task (MP)    0.027    0.027 
     [0.024]    [0.024] 
 Uncertainty Premium in the Ambiguous Prospect Task (AP)    0.027    0.027 
     [0.020]    [0.020] 
 Switching Point in the Low Prospect Task (LP)    -0.061**   -0.014 -0.041 
     [0.016]   [0.021] [0.024] 
 Gender Dummy: 1=Male; 0=Female 0.269* 0.048 0.061 0.060 0.264* 0.047 0.042 0.060 
  [0.133] [0.111] [0.111] [0.114] [0.131] [0.110] [0.110] [0.114] 
 City Dummy: 1=SG; 0=BJ -1.101** -0.911** -0.906** -0.797** -1.011** -0.836** -0.826** -0.797** 
  [0.131] [0.109] [0.109] [0.115] [0.130] [0.109] [0.110] [0.115] 
 Ages of Subjects as of the Experiment -0.021 -0.035 -0.034 -0.029 -0.006 -0.022 -0.023 -0.029 
  [0.037] [0.031] [0.031] [0.032] [0.036] [0.030] [0.030] [0.032] 
 Round Dummy: 1=Round 1, 0=Round 2 -0.212 -0.258* -0.262* -0.302** -0.264* -0.302** -0.301** -0.302** 
  [0.125] [0.105] [0.104] [0.107] [0.124] [0.104] [0.104] [0.107] 
 RPM IQ Score -0.012 0.029* 0.028* 0.021 -0.018 0.025* 0.024* 0.021 
  [0.013] [0.011] [0.011] [0.012] [0.014] [0.011] [0.011] [0.012] 
 Constant 3.173** -0.937 -1.209 -0.696 3.107** -1.028 -0.937 -0.696 
  [1.074] [0.902] [0.907] [0.961] [1.073] [0.906] [0.917] [0.961] 
Sigma Constant 3.454** 2.878** 2.874** 2.824** 3.423** 2.865** 2.865** 2.824** 
  [0.046] [0.038] [0.038] [0.039] [0.046] [0.038] [0.038] [0.039] 
Observation Summary         
 Left-censored observations at NFuture<=-10 35 35 35 29 32 32 32 29 
 Uncensored observations 2919 2919 2919 2698 2938 2938 2938 2698 
 Right-censored observations at NFuture >=10 125 125 125 116 125 125 125 116 
Note: (1) Standard errors are reported in the squared brackets below the estimated coefficients; 








Table A.16 Tobit and Probit Regression Results for Test of Hypothesis 3 
 Near-Term Bias: NFuture minus RFuture 
OLS Tobit Probit 
Ambiguity Premium: AP-MP 0.031 0.033 0.021* 
 [0.019] [0.019] [0.009] 
Risk Premium in the Moderate Prospect Task (MP) 0.060* 0.066** 0.028* 
 [0.024] [0.024] [0.012] 
Switching Point in the Near Future Task (NFuture) 0.559** 0.591** 0.174** 
 [0.019] [0.016] [0.008] 
Gender Dummy: 1=Male; 0=Female 0.099 0.111 -0.028 
 [0.105] [0.111] [0.053] 
City Dummy: 1=SG; 0=BJ -0.878** -0.902** -0.634** 
 [0.101] [0.109] [0.052] 
Ages of Subjects as of the Experiment -0.028 -0.030 -0.020 
 [0.029] [0.031] [0.014] 
Round Dummy: 1=Round 1, 0=Round 2 -0.282** -0.303** -0.146** 
 [0.099] [0.104] [0.049] 
RPM IQ Score 0.025* 0.025* 0.009 
 [0.012] [0.011] [0.005] 
Constant -0.957 2.836** -0.401 
 [0.887] [0.038] [0.425] 
R2 0.32   
Observations 3,021 3,021 3,021 
Note: (1) In the Probit model, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for near-term bias: D_NTB=1 if NTB>0; otherwise, D_NTB=0;  
(2) Standard errors are reported in the squared brackets below the estimated coefficients; 








Table A.17 Probit Regression Results for Test of Hypothesis 1.B 
 Near-Term Bias Dummy: 1 if NTB>0; 0 otherwise 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Risk Premium in the Moderate Prospect Task (MP) 0.015    0.005 
 [0.010]    [0.011] 
Switching Point in the Moderate Prospect Task (MP')  0.027***   0.022** 
  [0.008]   [0.010] 
Switching Point in the High Prospect Task (HP)   0.018***  0.005 
   [0.007]  [0.008] 
Switching Point in the Low Prospect Task (LP)    -0.002 -0.005 
    [0.007] [0.008] 
Switching Point in the Near Future Task (NFuture) 0.172*** 0.173*** 0.174*** 0.171*** 0.173*** 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Gender Dummy: 1=Male; 0=Female -0.042 -0.057 -0.037 -0.048 -0.040 
 [0.052] [0.051] [0.051] [0.051] [0.054] 
City Dummy: 1=SG; 0=BJ -0.627*** -0.657*** -0.633*** -0.634*** -0.632*** 
 [0.051] [0.050] [0.050] [0.051] [0.054] 
Ages of Subjects as of the Experiment -0.017 -0.017 -0.020 -0.014 -0.014 
 [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.015] 
Round Dummy: 1=Round 1, 0=Round 2 -0.149*** -0.148*** -0.160*** -0.162*** -0.170*** 
 [0.049] [0.048] [0.048] [0.048] [0.051] 
RPM IQ Score 0.009* 0.009* 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] 
Constant -0.394 -0.536 -0.317 -0.328 -0.502 
 [0.424] [0.412] [0.410] [0.418] [0.451] 
Observations 3,051 3,162 3,171 3,181 2,864 
Note: (1) Standard errors are reported in the squared brackets below the estimated coefficients; 
(2) * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
